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1 —4 






LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



Full Text of the Suppressed Document Written by 

the Man Who Was German Ambassador in 

London When the War Began 

Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Great Britain at 
the outbreak of the war, is the author of a secret memorandum entitled 
" My London Mission, 1012-1914," which was intended only for his pri- 
vate family archives, but which became public in March, 1918, creating 
a profound sensation in Germany. 
The document was written in 1916 
at the Prince's country seat in Sile- 
sia. It relates Lichnowsky's ex- 
periences as intermediary between 
the German and British Govern- 
ments during the crucial period 
leading up to the war, and its his- 
torical importance is due largely 
to its revelations of Germany's ac- 
tions in precipitating the crisis. 
Through channels described else- 
where in these pages, a copy 
of Lichnowsky's memorandum 
reached a newspaper in Stockholm, 
the Politiken, which published it 
in part. Other parts appeared in 
Berlin and Munich newspapers. 
The various parts were assembled 
by The New York Times and by 
the Current History Magazine of 
The New York Times Co., and the 
memorandum is herewith presented 
in its entirety, along with the full 
text of the reply made by Herr von Jagow, who was German Foreign 
Minister at the time. The corroborative evidence of Dr. Muehlon, former 
Krupp Director, with other matter, is also presented. Prince Lichnow- 
sky was deprived of his rank when his memorandum became public. 
On April 27 the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of 
the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of Berlin, authorizing 
him to begin criminal proceedings against the Prince " for infringing 
the secrecy of documents officially intrusted to him." Prince Lich- 




PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 






II. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



nowsky in the meantime is virtually a prisoner on his estate in Silesia. 
Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German General Staff, who was 
concerned in giving publicity to the Prince's memorandum, was arrested 
early in April on the charge that in aiding in the distribution of these 
documents he had been guilty of treason. 



Text of the Memorandum 



Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916. 

BARON MARSCHALL died in Sep- 
tember, 1912, having held his post 
in London for a few months only. 
His appointment, which was due 
mainly to his age and the plotting of a 
younger man to get to London, was one 
of the many mistakes made by our For- 
eign Office. In spite of his imposing per- 
sonality and great reputation, he was too 
old and tired to be able to adapt himself 
to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon 
milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat 
and a lawyer than a diplomat or states- 
man. He set to work to convince Eng- 
lishmen of the harmless character of our 
fleet, and naturally succeeded in strength- 
ening an entirely opposite impression. 

To my great surprise I was offered the 
post in October. After many years' 
work I had withdrawn to the country, as 
no suitable post had been found for me, 
and I spent my time on my farm and in 
my garden, on horseback and in the 
fields, but I read industriously and pub- 
lished occasional political articles. Thus 
eight years passed, and thirteen since I 
had left Vienna as Ambassador. That 
was actually my last political employ- 
ment. I do not know to whom my ap- 
pointment in London was due. At all 
events, not to his Majesty, as I did not 
belong to his immediate set, although he 
was always gracious to me. I know by 
experience that his candidates were fre- 
quently successfully opposed. As a mat- 
ter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter 
wanted to send Baron von Stumm to Lon- 
don. He met me at once with undis- 
guised ill-will, and tried to frighten me 
by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Holl- 
weg was amiable to me, and had visited 
me shortly before at Gratz. I am, there- 
fore, inclined to think that they settled 
on me, as no other candidate was avail- 
able. Had Baron von Marschall not 



died, it is unlikely that I should have 
been dug out any more than in previous 
years. The moment was obviously fa- 
vorable for an attempt to come to a bet- 
ter understanding with England. 

THE MOROCCO QUESTION 

Our obscure policy in Morocco had re- 
peatedly caused distrust of our peaceful 
intention, or, at least, had raised doubts 
as to whether we knew what we wanted 
or whether our intention was to keep 
Europe in a state of suspense and, on 
occasion, to humiliate the French. An 
Austrian colleague, who was a long time 
in Paris, said to me : " The French had 
begun to forget la revanche. You have 
regularly reminded them of it by tramp- 
ing on their toes." After we had declined 
Delcasse's offer to come to an agree- 
ment regarding Morocco, and then sol- 
emnly declared that we had no political 
interest there — an attitude which agreed 
with Bismarckian political conditions — 
we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a 
Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to 
the Boers, we promised the protection of 
the mighty German Empire, and with the 
same result. Both manifestations con- 
cluded, as they were bound to conclude, 
with a retraction, if we were not pre- 
pared to start a world war. The pitiable 
conference of Algeciras could alter noth- 
ing, and still less cause Delcasse's fall. 
Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japa- 
nese and Russo-British rapprochement. 
In face of " the German peril " all other 
considerations faded into the background. 
The possibility of another Franco-Ger- 
man war had been patent, and, as had 
not been the case in 1870, such a war 
could not leave out Russia or England. 

The valuelessness of the Triple Al- 
liance had already been demonstrated 
at Algeciras, and, immediately after- 
ward, the equal worthlessness of the 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



agreements made there when the Sul- 
tanate fell to pieces, which was, of 
course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the be- 
lief was spreading among the Russian 
people that our foreign policy was weak 
and was breaking down under " encircle- 
ment," and that cowardly surrender fol- 
lowed on haughty gestures. It is to the 
credit of von Kiderlen-Wachter, though 
otherwise overrated as a statesman, that 
he cleared up the Moroccan situation and 
adapted himself to circumstances which 
could not be altered. Whether the world 
had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a 
question I do not touch. This event was 
hailed with joy in Germany, but in Eng- 
land caused all the more uneasiness in 
that the British Government waited in 
vain for three weeks for a statement of 
our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Man- 
sion House speech, intended to warn us, 
was a consequence. Before Delcasse's 
fall and before the Algeciras conference 
we could have obtained harbors and 
bases on the West Coast, but that was 
no longer possible. 

ENGLAND SOUGHT AGREEMENT 

When I came to London in November, 
1912, people had become easier about the 
question of Morocco, especially since an 
agreement had been reached with France 
and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had 
failed, it is true, as we demanded promises 
of neutrality instead of contenting our- 
selves with a treaty which would insure 
us against a British attack or any attack 
with British support. Sir Edward Grey 
had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of 
coming to an understanding with us, and 
made such an attempt first on economic 
and colonial grounds. Through the 
agency of that qualified and expert Coun- 
cilor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, an ex- 
change of opinions had taken place with 
regard to the renewal of the Portuguese 
colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, 
which thus carried out the unexpected 
aim of dividing into spheres of interest 
both the above-mentioned colonies and 
Asia Minor. The British statesman, old 
points in dispute both with France and 
Russia having been settled, wished to 
come to a similar agreement with us. 
His intention was not to isolate us but 



to make us in so far as possible partners 
in a working concern. Just as he had 
succeeded in bridging Franco-British and 
Russo-British difficulties, so he wished 
as far as possible to remove German- 
British difficulties, and by a network 
of treaties — which would finally include 
an agreement on the miserable fleet ques- 
tion — to secure the peace of the world, 
as our earlier policy had lent itself to a 
co-operation with the Entente, which con- 
tained a mutual assurance against the 
danger of war. 

GREY'S DESIRES 

This was Sir Edward Grey's program 
in his own words : " Without infringing 
on the existing friendly relations with 
France and Russia, which in themselves 
contained no aggressive elements, and no 
binding obligations for England; to seek 
to achieve a more friendly rapproche- 
ment with Germany, and to bring the 
two group's nearer together." 

In England, as with us, there were 
two opinions, that of the optimists, who 
believed in an understanding, and that of 
the pessimists, who considered war in- 
evitable sooner or later. Among the 
former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward 
Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the 
Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well 
as leading Liberal organs, such as The 
Westminster Gazette, The Manchester 
Guardian, and The Daily Chronicle. To 
the pessimists belong especially Conser- 
vative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who 
repeatedly made his meaning clear to 
me; leading soldiers such as Lord Rob- 
erts, who insisted on the necessity of 
conscription, and on " the writing on the 
wall," and, further, the Northcliffe press, 
and that leading English journalist, Mr. 
Garvin of The Observer. During my 
term of office they abstained from all 
attacks and took up, personally and po- 
litically, a friendly attitude. Our naval 
policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 
1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused 
them to think that it might one day come 
to war. Just as with us, the former are 
now dubbed shortsighted and simple- 
minded, while the latter are regarded as 
the true prophets. 

The first Balkan war led to the collapse 



IV. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



of Turkey and with it the defeat of our 
policy, which had been identified with 
Turkey for many years. Since the salva- 
tion of Turkey in Europe was no longer 
feasible, only two possibilities for settling 
the question remained. Either we de- 
clared we had no longer any interest in 
the definition of boundaries in the Bal- 
kan Peninsula, and left the settlement of 
the question to the Balkan peoples them- 
selves, or we supported our allies and 
carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the 
East, thereby giving up the role of 
mediator. 

I urged the former course from the 
beginning, but the German Foreign Office 
very much preferred the latter. The chief 
question was Albania. Our allies desired 
the establishment of an independent 
State of Albania, as Austria would not 
allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and 
Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach 
Valona or even the territory north of 
Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is 
known, favored Serbian, and France 
Greek, desires. My advice was now to 
consider the question as outside the 
alliance, and to support neither Austrian 
nor Italian wishes. Without our support 
the establishment of Albania, whose in- 
capability of existence might have been 
foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia 
would have pushed forward to the coast; 
then the present world war would have 
been avoided. France and Italy would 
have remained definitely divided as to 
Greece, and the Italians, had they not 
wished to fight France alone, would have 
been obliged to consent to the expansion 
of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. 
The greater part of civilized Albania is 
Greek. The southern towns are entirely 
Greek, and, at the time of the conference 
of Ambassadors, deputations from the 
larger towns came to London to carry 
through the annexation to Greece. 

In Greece today whole groups are 
Albanian, and the so-called Greek na- 
tional dress is of Albanian origin. The 
amalgamation of the preponderating 
Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with 
the Greek State was, therefore, the best 
solution and the most natural, if one 
leaves out of account Scutari and the 
northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. 



His Majesty was also in favor of this 
solution on dynastic grounds. When I 
encouraged the monarch by letter to this 
effect, I received violent reproaches from 
the Chancellor for supporting Austria's 
opponents, and he forbade all such inter- 
ference in the future, and even direct 
correspondence. We had eventually, 
however, to abandon the tradition of car- 
rying out the Triple Alliance policy in 
the East and to acknowledge our mis- 
take, which consisted in identifying our- 
selves with the Turks in the south and 
the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the 
continuance of that policy, which we 
began at the Congress in Berlin and sub- 
sequently carried on zealously, was bound 
in time, should the necessary skill in 
conducting it fail, to lead to a collision 
with Russia and a world war. 

TURKEY, RUSSIA, ITALY 

Instead of uniting with Russia on the 
basis of the independence of the Sultan, 
whom the Russians also did not wish to 
drive out of Constantinople, and confin- 
ing ourselves to economic interests in the 
East, while at the same time refraining 
from all military and political interfer- 
ence and being satisfied with a division 
of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, 
the goal of our political ambition was to 
dominate in the Bosporus. In Russia, 
therefore, the opinion arose that the way 
to Constantinople and to the Mediter- 
ranean lay through Berlin. Instead of 
encouraging a powerful development in 
the Balkan States, which were once free 
and are very different from the Rus- 
sians, of which fact we have already had 
experience, we placed ourselves on the 
side of the Turkish and Magyar oppres- 
sors. The dire mistake of our Triple 
Alliance and our Eastern policies, which 
drove Russia — our natural friend and 
best neighbor — into the arms of France 
and England, and kept her from her 
policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more 
evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the 
only hypothesis justifying a Triple Al- 
liance policy, had to be eliminated from 
our calculations. 

As to the value of the alliance with 
Italy, one word only. Italy needs our 
money and our tourists after the war, 



L1CHN0W SKY'S MEMORANDUM 



with or without our alliance. That our 
alliance would go by the board in the 
event of war was to be foreseen. The 
alliance, consequently, was worthless. 

Austria, however, needed our protec- 
tion both in war and peace, and had no 
other point d'appui. This dependence on 
us is based on political, national, and 
economic grounds, and is all the greater 
in proportion to the intimacy of our re- 
lations with Russia. This was proved in 
the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, 
no Vienna Minister had been so self-con- 
scious with us as Count Aehrenthal was 
during the last years of his life. Under 
the influence of a properly conducted 
German policy which would keep us in 
touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is 
our vassal, and is tied to us even with- 
out an alliance and without reciprocal 
services; under the influence of a mis- 
guided policy, however, we are tied to 
Austria-Hungary. An alliance would 
therefore be purposeless. 

I know Austria far too well not to 
know that a return to the policy of Count 
Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count 
Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Lit- 
tle as the Slavs living there love us, they 
wish just as little for a return to the 
German Kaiserdom, even with a Haps- 
burg-Lorraine at its head. They are 
striving for an internal Austrian feder- 
ation on a national basis, a condition 
which is even less likely of realization 
within the German Empire than under 
the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look 
on Berlin as the centre of German power 
and Kultur, and they know that Austria 
can never be a leading power. They de- 
sire as close a connection as possible 
with the empire, but not to the extent 
of an anti-German policy. 

BALKAN QUARRELS 

Since the seventies the conditions have 
changed fundamentally in Austria, and 
also, perhaps, in Bavaria. Just as here 
a return to Pan-German particularism 
and the old Bavarian policy is not to 
be feared, so there a revival of the policy 
of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzen- 
berg is not to be contemplated. But by a 
constitutional union with Austria, which 
even without Galicia and Dalmatia is 



inhabited at least to the extent of one- 
half by non-Germans, our interests would 
suffer; while, on the other hand, by the 
subordination of our policy to the point 
of view of Vienna and Budapest, we 
should have to " epouser les querelles de 
l'Autriche." 

We, therefore, had no need to heed 
the desires of our allies. They were 
not only unnecessary but dangerous, in- 
asmuch as they would lead to a collision 
with Russia if we looked at Eastern ques- 
tions through Austrian eyes. The trans- 
formation of our alliance with its single 
original purpose into a complete alliance, 
involving a complexity of common inter- 
ests, was calculated to call forth the 
very state of things which the constitu- 
tional negotiations were designed to pre- 
vent, namely, war. Such a policy of al- 
liances would, moreover, entail the loss 
of the sympathies of the young, strong, 
and growing communities in the Balkan 
Peninsula, which were ready to turn to 
us and open their market to us. The 
contrast between dynastic and demo- 
cratic ideas had to be given clear ex- 
pression, and, as usual, we stood on the 
wrong side. King Carol told one of our 
representatives that he had made an al- 
liance with us on condition that we re- 
tained control of affairs, but that if that 
control passed to Austria it would en- 
tirely change the basis of affairs, and 
under those conditions he could no longer 
participate. Matters stood in the same 
position in Serbia, where against our 
own economic interests we were sup- 
porting an Austrian policy of strangu- 
lation. 

BACKED WRONG HORSES 

We had always backed horses which, it 
was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, 
Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of 
Wied, and finally — and this was the most 
miserable mistake of all — Count Berch- 
told. 

Shortly after my arrival in London, 
in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an 
informal exchange of views in order to 
prevent a European war developing out 
of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak 
of that war, we had unfortunately de- 
clined the proposal of the French Gov- 



VI. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



eminent to join in a declaration of dis- 
interestedness and impartiality on the 
part of the powers. The British statesman 
maintained from the beginning that 
England had no interest in Albania, and 
would, therefore, not go to war on the 
subject. In his role of " honest broker " 
he would confine his efforts to mediation 
and an attempt to smooth away difficul- 
ties between the two groups. He, there- 
fore, by no means placed himself on the 
side of the Entente Powers, and during 
the negotiations, which lasted about eight 
months, he lent his good- will and power- 
ful influence toward the establishment of 
an understanding. Instead of adopting 
the English point of view, we accepted 
that dictated to us by Vienna. Count 
Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in Lon- 
don and I was his second. 

GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY 

My duty was to support his proposals. 
The clever and experienced Count Szog- 
yenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His 
refrain was " casus foederis," and when 
once I dared to doubt the justice of this 
phrase I was seriously warned against 
Austrophobism. Referring to my father, 
it was even said that I had in- 
herited it. On every point, including 
Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Ad- 
riatic, Scutari, and in the definition of 
the Albanian frontiers, we were on the 
side of Austria and Italy, while Sir 
Edward Grey hardly ever took the French 
or Russian point of view. On the con- 
trary, he nearly always took our part 
in order to give no pretext for war — 
which was afterward brought about by a 
dead Archduke. It was with his help 
that King Nicholas was induced to leave 
Scutari. Otherwise there would have 
been war over this matter, as we should 
never have dared to ask " our allies " to 
make concessions. 

Sir Edward Grey conducted the nego- 
tiations with care, calm, and tact. When 
a question threatened to become involved 
he proposed a formula which met the 
case and always secured consent. He 
acquired the full confidence of all the 
representatives. 

Once again we had successfully with- 
stood one of the niany threats against 



the strength characterizing our policy. 
Russia had been obliged to give way to 
us all along the line, as she never got an 
opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. 
Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal 
State, and Serbia was driven away from 
the sea. The conference was thus a fresh 
humiliation for Russia. 

As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed 
the Russian program without German 
interests being brought into play. Bis- 
marck had to minimize the mistake of the 
Congress by a secret treaty, and his at- 
titude in the Battenberg question — the 
downward incline being taken by us in 
the Bosnian question — was followed up 
in London, and was not given up, with 
the result that it led to the abyss. 

The dissatisfaction then prevalent in 
Russia was given vent to during the 
London Conference by an attack in the 
Russian press on my Russian colleague 
and on Russian diplomacy. 

His German origin and Catholic faith, 
his reputation as a friend of Germany, 
and the accident that he was related both 
to Count Mensdorff and to myself were 
all made use of by dissatisfied parties. 
Although not a particularly important 
personality, Count Benckendorff pos- 
sessed many qualities of a good diplomat 
— tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an 
agreeable personality, and a natural eye 
for men and things. He sought always 
to avoid provocative attitudes, and was 
supported by the attitude of England 
and France. 

I once said : " The feeling in Russia is 
very anti-German." He replied : " There 
are also many strong influential pro- 
German circles there. But the people 
generally are an ti- Austrian." 

It only remains to be added that our 
exaggerated Austrophilism is not exact- 
ly likely to break up the Entente and 
turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic 
interests. 

PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY 

[The next passages, which had formerly 
been suppressed by the Swedish Government, 
appeared in the Politiken of Stockholm on 
March 26:] 

At the same time (1913) the Balkan 
Conference met in London, and I had the 
opportunity of meeting the leading men 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



VII. 



of the Balkan States. The most im- 
portant personage among them was M. 
Venizelos. He was anything but anti- 
German, and particularly prized the 
Order of the Red Eagle, which he even 
wore at the French Embassy. With his 
winning amiability and savoir faire he 
could always win sympathy. 

Next to him a great role was played 
by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime 
Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. 
He gave the impression of being a 
capable and energetic man, and even the 
influence of his friends at Vienna and 
Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, 
was attributable to the fact that he had 
let himself be drawn into the second 
Balkan war and had declined Russian 
intervention. 

M. Take Jonescu was often in Lon- 
don, too, and visited me regularly. I 
had known him since the time when I was 
Secretary at Bucharest. He was also 
one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter's 
friends. His aim in London was to secure 
concessions for Rumania by negotiations 
with M. Daneff. In this he was sup- 
ported by the most capable Rumanian 
Minister, M. Misu. That these negotia- 
tions were stranded by the Bulgarian op- 
position is known. Count Berchtold — and 
naturally we with him — was entirely on 
the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should 
have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff 
in obtaining the desired satisfaction for 
the Rumanians and have bound Rumania 
to us, as she was by Austria's attitude 
in the second Balkan war, while after- 
ward she was estranged from the Central 
Powers. 

AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED 

Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan 
war and Serbia's victory, as well as the 
Rumanian advance, naturally constituted 
a reproach to Austria. The idea of equal- 
izing this by military intervention in 
Serbia seems to have gained ground 
rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by 
the Italian disclosure, and it may be 
presumed that the Marquis di San Giu- 
liano, who described the plan as a " peri- 
colossissima adventura," (an extremely 
risky adventure,) saved us from a Euro- 
pean war as far back as the Summer of 



1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian rela- 
tions were, the aspiration of Vienna must 
have been known in St. Petersburg. In 
any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that 
M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that 
an attack on Serbia on the part of Aus- 
tria meant war with Russia. 

In the Spring of 19.14 one of my Secre- 
taries, on returning from leave in Vi- 
enna, said that Herr von Tschirschky 
[German Ambassador in Vienna] had 
declared that war must soon come. But 
as I was always kept in the dark regard- 
ing important things, I considered his 
pessimism unfounded. 

Ever since the peace of Bucharest it 
seems to have been the opinion in Vienna 
that the revision of this treaty should be 
undertaken independently, and only a 
favorable opportunity was awaited. The 
statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest 
could naturally count upon our support. 
This they knew, for already they had 
been reproached several times for their 
slackness. Berlin even insisted on the 
" rehabilitation " of Austria. 

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 

. When I returned to London in De- 
cember, 1913, after a long holiday, the 
Liman von Sanders question had led to 
our relations with Russia becoming acute. 
Sir Edward Grey called my attention 
with some uneasiness to the consequent 
unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: " I 
have never seen them so excited." Berlin 
instructed me to beg the Minister to 
urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to 
solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was 
quite willing, and his intervention con- 
tributed not inconsiderably to smoothing 
matters over. My good relations with 
Sir Edward and his great influence in 
St. Petersburg served in a like manner 
on several occasions when it was a ques- 
tion of carrying through something of 
which our representative there was com- 
pletely incapable. 

During the critical days of July, 1914, 
Sir Edward said to me : " If ever you 
want something done in St. Petersburg 
you come to me regularly, but if ever I 
appeal for your influence in Vienna you 
refuse your support." The good and de- 
pendable relations I was fortunate in 



VIII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



making not only in society and among 
influential people, such as Sir Edward 
Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with 
others at public dinners, had brought 
about a noticeable improvement in our 
relations with England. Sir Edward de- 
voted himself honestly to further this 
rapprochement, and his intentions were 
especially noticeable in two questions — 
the Colonial Treaty and the treaty re- 
garding the Bagdad Railway. 

THE AFRICAN AGREEMENT 

[This portion is translated from the Muen- 
chener Neueste Nachrichten.] 

In the year 1898 a secret treaty had 
been signed by Count Hatzfeldt [then 
German Ambassador in London] and Mr. 
Balfour, which divided the Portuguese 
colonies in Africa into economic-political 
spheres of interest between us and Eng- 
land. As the Portuguese Government 
possessed neither the power nor the 
means to open up or adequately to ad- 
minister its extensive possessions, the 
Portuguese Government had already at 
an earlier date thought of selling these 
possessions and thereby putting their 
finances in order. 

Between us and England an agreement 
had been reached which defined the in- 
terests of the two parties and which was 
of all the greater value because Portugal, 
as is well known, is completely dependent 
upon England. This treaty was no doubt 
to secure outwardly the integrity and in- 
dependence of the Portuguese Empire, 
and it only expressed the intention of 
giving financial and economic assistance 
to the Portuguese. Consequently it did 
not, according to the text, conflict with 
the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dat- 
ing from the fifteenth century, which was 
last renewed under Charles II. and which 
guaranteed the territories of the two par- 
ties. Nevertheless, at the instance of 
the Marquis Soveral, who presumably 
was not ignorant of the Anglo-German 
agreement, a new treaty — the so-called 
Windsor treaty — which confirmed the 
old agreements, was concluded in 1899 
between England and Portugal. 

ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE 

The object of the negotiations be- 
tween us and England, which had begun 



before by arrival, was to alter and amend 
our treaty of 1898, which contained many 
impossible features — for example, with 
regard to the geographical delimitation. 
Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of 
the British Government, I succeeded in 
giving to the new treaty a form which 
entirely accorded with our wishes and in- 
terests. All Angola, as far as the 20th 
degree of longitude, was allotted to us, 
so that we reached the Congo territory 
from the south. Moreover, the valuable 
islands of San Thome and Principe, 
which lie north of the equator, and there- 
fore really belonged to the French sphere 
of interest, were allotted to us — a fact 
which caused my French colleague to 
make lively, although vain, representa- 
tions. Further, we obtained the northern 
part of Mozambique; the frontier was 
formed by the Likungo. 

The British Government showed the 
utmost readiness to meet out interests 
and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended 
to prove his good-will to us, but he also 
desired to promote our colonial develop- 
ment, because England hoped to divert 
Germany's development of strength from 
the North Sea and Western Europe to 
the world-sea and Africa. " We don't 
want to grudge Germany her colonial 
development," a member of the Cabinet 
said to me. 

THE CONGO STATE 

Originally, at the British suggestion, 
the Congo State was to be included in 
the treaty, which would have given us a 
right of pre-emption and a possibility of 
economic penetration in the Congo State. 
But we refused this offer, out of alleged 
respect for Belgian sensibilities! Per- 
haps the idea was to economize our suc- 
cesses? With regard also to the prac- 
tical realization of the real but unex- 
pressed object of the treaty — the actual 
partition at a later date of the Portu- 
guese colonial possessions — the new for- 
mulation showed considerable advantages 
and progress as compared with the old. 
Thus the treaty contemplated circum- 
stances which would enable us to enter 
the territories ascribed to us, for the 
protection of our interests. 

These conditional clauses were so wide 



LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 



IX. 



that it was really left to us to decide 
when really " vital " interests were con- 
cerned, so that, in view of the complete 
dependence of Portugal upon England 
we merely needed to go on cultivating 
our relations with England in order, later 
on, with English assent, to realize our 
mutual intentions. 

The sincerity of the English Govern- 
ment in its effort to respect our rights 
was proved by the fact that Sir Edward 
Grey, before ever the treaty was com- 
pleted or signed, called our attention to 
English men of business who were seek- 
ing opportunities to invest capital in the 
territories allotted to us by the new 
treaty, and who desired British support. 
In doing so he remarked that the under- 
takings in question belonged to our 
sphere of interest. 

WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES 

The treaty was practically complete 
at the time of the King's visit to Berlin 
in May, 1913. A conversation then took 
place in Berlin under the Presidency of 
the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Beth- 
mann Hollweg,) in which I took part, 
and at which special wishes were laid 
down. On my return to London I suc- 
ceeded, with the help of my Counselor of 
Embassy, von Kuhlmann, who was work- 
ing upon the details of the treaty with 
Mr. Parker, in putting through our last 
proposals also. It was possible for the 
whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Ed- 
ward Grey and myself in August, 1913, 
before I went on leave. Now, however, 
new difficulties were to arise, which pre- 
vented the signature, and it was only a 
year later, shortly before the outbreak 
of war, that I was able to obtain author- 
ization for the final settlement. Signa- 
ture, however, never took place. 

Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign 
only if the treaty was published, together 
with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; 
England has no other secret treaties, and 
it is contrary to her existing principles 
that she should conceal binding agree- 
ments. He said, however, that he was 
ready to take account of our wishes con- 
cerning the time and manner of publica- 
tion, provided that publication took place 
within one year, at latest, after the sig- 



nature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, 
however, where my London successes 
aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and 
where an influential personage, [the 
reference is apparently to Herr von 
Stumm,] who played the part of Herr 
von Holstein, was claiming the London 
Embassy for himself, it was stated that 
the publication would imperil our inter- 
ests in the colonies, because the Portu- 
guese would show their gratitude by 
giving us no more concessions. The ac- 
curacy of this excuse is illuminated by 
the fact that the old treaty was most 
probably just as much long known to 
the Portuguese as our new agreements 
must have been, in view of the intimacy 
of relations between Portugal and Eng- 
land; it was illuminated also by the 
fact that, in view of the influence which 
England possesses at Lisbon, the Por- 
tuguese Government is completely power- 
less in face of an Anglo-German under- 
standing. 

WRECKING THE TREATY 

Consequently, it was necessary to find 
another excuse for wrecking the treaty. 
It was said that the publication of the 
Windsor Treaty, which was concluded 
in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and 
which was merely a renewal of the treaty 
of Charles II., which had never lapsed, 
might imperil the position of Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of 
British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this 
I pointed out that the preamble to our 
treaties said exactly the same thing as 
the Windsor Treaty and other similar 
treaties — namely, that we desired to pro- 
tect the sovereign rights of Portugal and 
the integrity of its possessions! 

In spite of repeated conversations with 
Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister 
made ever fresh proposals concerning 
publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office 
remained obstinate, and finally agreed 
with Sir Edward Goschen [British Am- 
bassador in Berlin] that everything 
should remain as it was before. So the 
treaty, which gave us extraordinary ad- 
vantages, the result of more than one 
year's work, had collapsed because it 
would have been a public success for me. 

When in the Spring of 1914 I happened, 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. 
Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was 
present, to mention the matter, the Co- 
lonial Secretary said that he was embar- 
rassed and did not know how to behave. 
He said that the present state of affairs 
was intolerable, because he [Mr. Har- 
court] wanted to respect our rights, but, 
on the other hand, was in doubt as to 
whether he should follow the old treaty 
or the new. He said that it was there- 
fore extremely desirable to clear matters 
up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair 
which had been hanging on for so long. 

"A DISASTROUS MISTAKE" 

When I reported to this effect I re- 
ceived a rude and excited order, telling 
me to refrain from any further interfer- 
ence in the matter. 

I now regret that I did not go to Ber- 
lin in order to offer his Majesty my 
resignation, and that I still did not lose 
my belief in the possibility of an agree- 
ment between me and the leading [Ger- 
man] personages. That was a disas- 
trous mistake, which was to be tragical- 
ly avenged some months later. 

Slight though was the extent to which 
I then still possessed the good-will of the 
Imperial Chancellor — because he feared 
that I was aiming at his office — I must 
do him the justice to say that at the end 
of June, 1914, in our last conversation 
before the outbreak of war, he gave his 
consent to the signature and publication. 
Nevertheless, it required further repeat- 
ed suggestions on my part, which were 
supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial 
Secretary,] in order at last to obtain 
official consent at the end of July. Then 
the Serbian crisis was already threaten- 
ing the peace of Europe, and so the com- 
pletion of the treaty had to be postponed. 
The treaty is now one of the victims of 
the war. 

BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY 

[This portion is translated from the Stock- 
holm Politiken o'f March 26.] 

At the same time, while the African 
agreement was under discussion, I was 
negotiating, with the effective co-opera- 
tion of Herr von Kiihlmann, the so-called 
Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in 



fact, at the division of Asia Minor into 
spheres of interest, although this expres- 
sion was carefully avoided in considera- 
tion of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward 
Grey declared repeatedly that there was 
no agreement between England and 
France aiming at a division of Asia 
Minor. 

In the presence of the Turkish repre- 
sentative, Hakki Pasha, all economic 
questions in connection with the German 
treaty were settled mainly in accordance 
with the wishes Of the Ottoman Bank. 
The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey 
made me personally was the continuation 
of the line to Basra. We had not insisted 
on this terminus in order to establish 
connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto 
Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. 
The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to 
be in the hands of an international com- 
mission. We also obtained a share in 
the harbor works at Basra, and even 
acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, 
hitherto the monopoly of the firm of 
Lynch. 

By this treaty the whole of Meso- 
potamia up to Basra became our zone of 
interest, whereby the whole British 
rights, the question of shipping on the 
Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments 
were left untouched, as well as all the 
district of Bagdad and the Anatolian 
railways. 

The British economic territories in- 
cluded the coasts of the Persian Gulf 
and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the 
French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. 
Had both treaties been concluded and 
published, an agreement would have 
been reached with England which would 
have finally ended all doubt of the pos- 
sibility of an Anglo-German co-opera- 
tion. 

GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 

Most difficult of all, there remained 
the question of the fleet. It was never 
quite rightly judged. The creation of 
a mighty fleet on the other shore of 
the North Sea and the simultaneous de- 
velopment of the Continent's most impor- 
tant military power into its most impor- 
tant naval power had at least to be rec- 
ognized by England as uncomfortable. 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XI. 



This presumably cannot be doubted. To 
maintain the necessary lead and not to 
become dependent, to preserve the su- 
premacy of the sea, which Britain must 
have in order not to go down, she had to 
undertake preparations and expenses 
which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. 
A threat against the British world posi- 
tion was made in that our policy allowed 
the possibility of warlike development to 
appear. This possibility was obviously 
near during the Morocco crisis and the 
Bosnian question. 

People had become reconciled to our 
fleet in its definite strength. Obviously 
it was not welcome to the British and 
constituted one of the motives, but neither 
the only nor the most important motive, 
for England's joining hands with Russia 
and France. On account of our fleet 
alone, however, England would have 
drawn the sword as little as on account 
of our trade, which it is pretended called 
forth her jealousy and ultimately brought 
about war. 

From the beginning I adopted the 
standpoint that in spite of the fleet it 
would be possible to come to a friendly 
understanding and rapproachement if 
we did not propose new votes of credit, 
and, above all, if we carried out an indis- 
putable peace policy. I also avoided all 
mention of the fleet, and between me and 
Sir Edward Grey the word was never ut- 
tered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one 
occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The 
present German Ambassador has never 
mentioned the fleet to me." 

UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE 

During my term of office the then 
First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the 
question of a so-called naval holiday, 
and proposed, for financial reasons as 
much as on account of the pacifist incli- 
nations of his party, a one year's pause 
in armaments. Officially the suggestion 
was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. 
He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. 
Churchill spoke to me on repeated occa- 
sions. 

I am convinced that his initiative was 
honest, cunning in general not being 
part of the Englishman's constitution. It 
would have been a great success for Mr. 



Churchill to secure economies for the 
country and to lighten the burden of ar- 
mament, which was weighing heavily 
on the people. 

I maintain that it would have been dif- 
ficult to support his intention. How 
about the workmen employed for this 
purpose? How about the technical per- 
sonnel? Our naval program was set- 
tled, and it would be difficult to alter 
it. Nor, on the other hand, did we in- 
tend exceeding it. But he pointed out 
that the means spent on portentous ar- 
maments could equally be used for other 
purposes. I maintain that such expen- 
diture would have benefited home indus- 
tries. 

NO TRADE JEALOUSY 

I also succeeded, in conversation with 
Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's 
private secretary, in keeping away from 
that subject without raising suspicion, al- 
though it came up in Parliament, and 
in preventing the Government's proposal 
from being made. But it was Mr. 
Churchill's and the Government's favor- 
ite idea that by supporting his initiative 
in the matter of large ships we should 
give proof of our good-will and consid- 
erably strengthen and increase the ten- 
dency on the part of the Government to 
get in closer contact with us. But, as I 
have said, it was possible in spite of our 
fleet and without naval holidays to come 
to an understanding. 

In that spirit I had carried out my 
mission from the beginning, and had 
even succeeded in realizing my program 
when the war broke out and destroyed 
everything. 

Trade jealousy, so much talked about 
among us, rests on faulty judgment of 
circumstances. It is a fact that Ger- 
many's progress as a trading country 
after the war of 1870 and during the 
following decades threatened the inter- 
ests of British trade circles, constituting 
a form of monopoly with its industry 
and export houses. But the growing in- 
terchange of merchandise with Germany, 
which was first on the list of all Euro- 
pean exporting countries, a fact I al- 
ways referred to in my public speeches, 
had allowed the desire to mature to pre- 



XII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



serve good relations with England's best 
client and business friend, and had grad- 
ually suppressed all other thoughts and 
motives. The Englishman, as a matter 
of fact, adapts himself to circumstances 
and does not tilt against windmills. In 
commercial circles I found the greatest 
good-will and desire to further our com- 
mon economic interests. 

AMIABLY RECEIVED 

In other circles I had a most amiable 
reception, and enjoyed the cordial good- 
will of the Court, society, and the Gov- 
ernment. No one there interested him- 
self in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or 
even the French representative, in spite 
of the imposing personality and political 
success of the last named. Only the Ger- 
man and American Ambassadors at- 
tracted public attention. 

In order to get in touch with the most 
important business circles I accepted in- 
vitations from the United Chambers of 
Commerce, the London and Bradford 
Chambers, and those of the great cities 
of Newcastle and Liverpool. I had a 
hearty reception everywhere. Glasgow 
and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I 
promised them visits. People who did 
not understand English conditions and 
did not appreciate the value of public 
dinners, and others who disliked my suc- 
cess, reproached me with having done 
harm by my speeches. I, on the con- 
trary, believe that my public appearances 
and my discussion of common economic 
interests contributed considerably toward 
the improvement of conditions, apart 
from the fact that it would have been 
impolitic and impolite to refuse invita- 
tions. 

In other circles I had a most amiable 
reception and enjoyed the cordial good- 
will of the Court, society, and the Gov- 
ernment. 

INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN 

The King, very amiable and well mean- 
ing and possessed of sound understand- 
ing and common sense, was invariably 
well disposed toward me and desired hon- 
estly to facilitate my mission. In spite 
of the small amount of power which the 
British Constitution gives the Crown, the 



King can, by virtue of his position, 
greatly influence the tone both of so- 
ciety and the Government. The Crown 
is the apex of society from which the 
tone emanates. Society, which is over- 
whelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied 
by ladies connected with politics. It is 
represented in the Lords and the Com- 
mons, consequently also in the Cabinet. 
The Englishman either belongs to so- 
ciety or ought to belong to it. His aim 
is, and always will be, to be a dis- 
tinguished man and a gentleman, and 
even men of modest origin, such as" Mr. 
Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its 
elegant women. 

POLITICS AND SOCIETY 

British gentlemen of both parties en- 
joy the same education, go to the same 
colleges and university, and engage in 
the same sports — golf, cricket, lawn 
tennis, and polo. All have played cricket 
and football in their youth, all have the 
same habits, and all spend the week-end. 
in the country. No social cleavage di- 
vides the parties, only political cleavage. 
To some extent of late years the poli- 
ticians in the two camps have avoided 
one another in society. Not even on the 
ground of a neutral mission could the 
two camps be amalgamated, for since 
the Home Rule and Veto bills the Union- 
ists have despised the Radicals. A few 
months after my arrival the King and 
Queen dined with me, and Lord London- 
derry left the house after dinner in order 
not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. 
But there is no opposition from differ- 
ence in caste and education as in France. 
There are not two worlds, but the same 
world, and their opinion of a foreigner 
is common and not without influence on 
his political standing, whether a Lans- 
downe or an Asquith is at the helm. 

The difference of caste no longer ex- 
ists in England since the time of the 
Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy 
(in contradistinction to the Tory county 
families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the 
towns to rise in society. There is greater 
difference in political opinions on consti- 
tutional or Church questions than on 
financial or political questions. Aristo- 
crats who have joined the popular party, 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XIII. 



Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Har- 
court, and Crewe, are most hated by the 
Unionist aristocracy. None of these gen- 
tlemen have I ever met in great aristo- 
cratic houses, only in the houses of party 
friends. 

We were received in London with open 
arms and both parties outdid one another 
in amiability. 

It would be a mistake to undervalue 
social connections in view of the close 
connection in England between society 
and politics, even though the majority of 
the upper ten thousand are in opposition 
to the Government. Between an Asquith 
and a Devonshire there is no such deep 
cleft as between a Briand and a Due de 
Doudeauville, for example. In times of 
political tension they do not foregather. 
They belong to two separate social 
groups, but are part of the same society, 
if on different levels, the centre of which 
is the Court. They have friends and 
habits in common, they are often related 
or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd 
George, a man of the people, a small so- 
licitor and a self-made man, is an ex- 
ception. Even John Burns, a Socialist 
Labor leader and a self-taught man, 
seeks society relations. On the ground 
of a general striving to be considered 
gentlemen of social weight and position 
such men must not be undervalued. 

In no place, consequently, is an en- 
voy's social circle of greater consequence 
than in England. A hospitable house 
with friendly guests is worth more than 
the profoundest scientific knowledge, 
and a learned man of insignificant ap- 
pearance and too small means would, in 
spite of all his learning, acquire no in- 
fluence. The Briton hates a bore and a 
pedant. He loves a good fellow. 

SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM 

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all 
questions of foreign policy was almost 
unlimited. True, he used to say on im- 
portant occasions: " I must lay that be- 
fore the Cabinet"; but it is equally true 
that the latter invariably took his view. 
Although he did not know foreign coun- 
tries and, with the exception of one short 
visit to Paris, had never left England, 
he was closely informed on all important 



questions, owing to many years' Parlia- 
mentary experience and natural grasp. 
He understood French without speaking 
it. Elected at an early age to Parlia- 
ment, he began immediately to occupy 
himself with foreign affairs. Parlia- 
mentary Under Secretary of State at the 
Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he 
became in 1906 Secretary of State under 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and 
filled the post for ten years. 

Sprung from an old North of England 
family of landowners, from whom the 
statesman, Earl Grey, is also descended, 
he joined the left wing of his party and 
sympathized with the Socialists and 
pacifists. He can be called a Socialist 
in the ideal sense, for he applied his 
theories even in private life, which is 
characterized by great simplicity and 
unpretentiousness, although he is pos- 
sessed of considerable means. All dis- 
play is foreign to him. He had a small 
residence in London and never gave din- 
ners, except officially, at the Foreign 
Office on the King's birthday. 

SIMPLE MODE OF LIFE 

If, exceptionally, he asked a few 
guests to his house, it was to a simple 
dinner or luncheon in a small circle with 
parlor maids for service. The week-ends 
he spent regularly in the country, like 
his colleagues, but not at large country 
house parties. He lives mostly in his 
cottage in the New Forest, taking long 
walks, and is passionately fond of nature 
and ornithology. Or he journeyed to 
his property in the north and tamed 
squirrels. In his youth he was a noted 
cricket and tennis player. His chief 
sport is now salmon and trout fishing in 
the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, 
Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, 
when spending his week-ends with Lord 
Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a 
bicycle and returned in the same way. 
His simple, upright manner insured him 
the esteem even of his opponents, who 
were more easily to be found in home 
than in foreign political circles. 

Lies and intrigue were foreign to his 
nature. His wife, whom he loved and 
from whom he was never separated, died 
as the result of an accident to the car- 



XIV. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



riage driven by him. As is known, one 
brother was killed by a lion. 

Wordsworth was his favorite poet, and 
he could quote him by the hour. His 
British calm did not lack a sense of 
humor. When breakfasting with us and 
the children and he heard their German 
conversation, he would say, " I cannot 
help admiring the way they talk Ger- 
man," and laughed at his joke. This is 
the man who was called " the Liar 
Grey " and the " originator of the world 
war." 

ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY 

Asquith is a man of quite different 
mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend 
of the ladies, especially young and beau- 
tiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings 
and a good cook, and is supported by a 
cheery young wife. He was formerly a 
well-known lawyer, with a large income 
and many years' Parliamentary experi- 
ence. Later he was known as a Minister 
under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend 
Grey, and friendly to an understanding 
with Germany. He treated all questions 
with an experienced business man's calm 
and certainty, and enjoyed good health 
and excellent nerves, steeled by assidu- 
ous golf. 

His daughters went to a German 
boarding school and speak fluent German. 
We quickly became good friends with 
him and his family, and were guests at 
his little house on the Thames. 

He only rarely occupied himself with 
foreign affairs. When important ques- 
tions cropped up, with him lay the ulti- 
mate decision. During the critical days 
of July Asquith often came to warn us, 
and he was ultimately in despair over 
the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, 
when I saw Asquith in order to make a 
final attempt, he was completely broken, 
and, although quite calm, tears ran down 
his face. 

NICOLSON AND TYRRELL 

Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William 
Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the 
Foreign Office. The former was not our 
friend, but his attitude toward me was 
consistently correct and obliging. Our 
personal relations were of the best. 
Neither did he wish for war, but when 



we [moved?] against France he un- 
doubtedly worked for immediate inter- 
vention. He was the confidant of my 
French colleague, and was in constant 
touch with him, and was destined to suc- 
ceed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, 
Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in 
St. Petersburg, and had concluded the 
treaty of 1907 which enabled Russia to 
turn again to the West and the Near 
East. 

Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, 
Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater in- 
fluence than the Permanent Under Sec- 
retary of State. This unusually intelli- 
gent man had been at a school in Ger- 
many, and had then entered the Diplo- 
matic Service, but he was abroad only a 
short time. At first he belonged to the 
modern anti-German school of young 
English diplomats, but later he became 
a determined supporter of an understand- 
ing. To this aim and object he even in- 
fluenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom 
he was very intimate. After the out- 
break of war he left the department, and 
went to the Home Office, probably in 
consequence of criticism of him for his 
Germanophile leanings. 

CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY 

The rage of certain gentlemen over my 
success in London and the position I had 
achieved was indescribable. Schemes 
were set on foot to impede my carrying 
out my duties, I was left in complete 
ignorance of most important things, and 
had to confine myself to sending in un- 
important and dull reports. Secret re- 
ports from agents about things of which 
I could know nothing without spies and 
necessary funds were never available for 
me, and it was only in the last days of 
July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from 
the Naval Attache of the secret Anglo- 
French agreement for joint action of the 
two fleets in case of war. Soon after my 
arrival I became convinced that in no 
circumstances need we fear a British 
attack or British support of a foreign 
attack, but that under all conditions Eng- 
land would protect France. I advanced 
this opinion in repeated reports with de- 
tailed reasoning and insistence, but with- 
out gaining credence, although Lord Hal- 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



xv. 



dane's refusing of the formula of neutral- 
ity and England's attitude during the 
Morocco crisis were clear indications. In 
addition, the above-mentioned secret 
agreements were known to the depart- 
ment. I repeatedly urged that England, 
as a commercial State, would suffer 
greatly in any war between the European 
great powers, and would therefore pre- 
vent such a war by all available means; 
but, on the other hand, in the interest of 
the European balance of power, and to 
prevent Germany's overlordship, would 
never tolerate the weakening or destruc- 
tion of France. Lord Haldane told me 
this shortly after my arrival. All in- 
fluential people spoke in the same way. 

THE ARCHDUKE'S DEATH 

At the end of June I went to Kiel by 
the royal orders a few weeks after I had 
received the honorary degree of Doctor 
at Oxford, an honor no German Ambas- 
sador since Herr von Bunsen had re- 
ceived. On board the Meteor we re- 
ceived the news of the death of the Arch- 
duke, the heir to the throne. His Majes- 
ty complained that his attempts to win 
the noble Archduke over to his ideas 
were thereby rendered fruitless. How 
far plans for an active policy against 
Serbia had already been made at Kono- 
pischt I am not in a position to judge. 
As I was not informed about intentions 
and events in Vienna I attached no fur- 
ther importance to the matter. I could 
only observe that the feeling of relief 
outweighed the other feelings of the Aus- 
trian aristocrats. One of the guests on 
board the Meteor was the Austrian Count 
Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather 
seasickness had kept him to his cabin. 
After receiving the news he became well. 
Shock or joy had cured him. 

On reaching Berlin I visited the Chan- 
cellor, and said I considered the situa- 
tion of our foreign policy very satisfac- 
tory, as we were on better terms with 
England than we had been for a long 
time. In France a pacifist Government 
was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann 
Hollweg did not seem to share my opti- 
mism, and complained of the Russian 
armaments. I tried to calm him, and 
pointed out especially that Russia had 



absolutely no interest in attacking us, 
and that such an attack would not re- 
ceive Anglo-French support, as both 
countries, England and France, desired 
peace. Then I called on Dr. Zimmer- 
mann, who represented von Jagow, and 
learned from him that Russia was about 
to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From 
his manner of speaking he was evidently 
annoyed with Russia, who was every- 
where in our way. There was also the 
question of the difficulties of commercial 
politics. Of course, I was not told that 
General von Moltke was working eagerly 
for war. But I learned that Herr von 
Tschirschky had received a rebuff for 
having reported that he had advised 
moderation in Vienna toward Serbia. 

AUSTRIA'S WAR PLOT 

On my return journey from Silesia I 
only remained a few hours in Berlin, but 
I heard there that Austria intended to 
take steps against Serbia to put an end 
to this intolerable situation. Unfor- 
tunately I undervalued the importance 
of the information. I thought nothing 
would come of it, and that it would be 
easy to settle the matter if Russia threat- 
ened. I now regret that I did not stop 
in Berlin, and at once declare that I could 
not agree to such a policy. 

I have since learned that the inquiries 
and appeals from Vienna won uncon- 
ditional assent from all the influential 
men at a decisive consultation at Pots- 
dam on July 5, with the comment that it 
would not matter if war with Russia re- 
sulted. This is what was stated, any- 
how, in the Austrian protocol which 
Count Mensdorff received in London. 
Shortly afterward Herr von Jagow ar- 
rived in Vienna to discuss the whole 
question with Count Berchtold. 

Subsequently, I received instructions 
to work to obtain a friendly attitude on 
the part of the English press, if Austria 
dealt Serbia a deathblow, and by my in- 
fluence to prevent so far as possible 
public opinion from becoming opposed to 
Austria. Remembering England's atti- 
tude during the annexation crisis, when 
public opinion sympathized with Serbian 
rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favoring 
of national movements in the time of 



XVI. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one 
thing and another indicated so strongly 
the improbability of British support of 
the proposed punitive expedition against 
the Archduke's murderers, that I felt 
bound to issue a serious warning. I also 
sent a warning against the whole project, 
which I characterized as adventurous and 
dangerous, and advised moderation being 
urged on the Austrians, as I did not 
believe in the localization of the conflict. 

JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF 

Herr von Jagow answered that Russia 
was not ready, that there would be some 
fuss, but that the more firmly we held 
to Austria the sooner would Russia give 
way. Austria, he said, had already ac- 
cused us of flabbiness, (flaumacherei,) 
and so we must not get into a mess. 
Opinion in Russia, he added, was becom- 
ing more and more pro-German, so we 
must just take the risks. In view of this 
attitude, which, as I subsequently found 
out, was the result of Count Pourtales's 
reports that Russia would in no circum- 
stances move, and caused us to urge 
Count Berchtold to the greatest possible 
energy, I hoped for salvation in English 
intervention, as I knew Sir Edward 
Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in 
the direction of peace could prevail. I 
availed myself, therefore, of my good 
relations with the British Foreign Min- 
ister to beg him confidentially to advise 
moderation on the part of Russia in case 
Austria, as appeared probable, should de- 
mand satisfaction from the Serbians. 

In the beginning the attitude of the 
English press toward the Austrians was 
quiet and friendly, as the murder was 
condemned. Little by little, however, 
voices increased in number insisting 
that, however necessary the punishment 
of a crime might be, no elaboration of 
it for a political purpose could be justi- 
fied. Austria was urgently called upon 
to act with moderation. The whole world 
outside Berlin and Vienna understood 
that it meant war, and world war. The 
British fleet, which happened to be as- 
sembled for review, was not demobilized. 

The Serbian answer corresponded with 
British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch 
had accepted all but two points, about 



which he was prepared to negotiate. Had 
England and Russia wanted war in order 
to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would 
have been given, and the unspeakable 
note would have remained unanswered. 
Sir Edward Grey went through the Ser- 
bian answer with me, and pointed out the 
conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Gov- 
ernment. We even discussed his proposal 
for intervention, which should insure an 
interpretation of these two points ac- 
ceptable to both parties. With Sir Ed- 
ward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the 
Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, 
and it would have been easy to find an 
acceptable form for the points under dis- 
cussion, which were mainly concerned 
with the part to be taken by Austrian of- 
ficials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With 
good- will all could have been cleared up in 
two or three sittings, and a simple 
acknowledgment of the British proposal 
would have brought about a detente and 
further improved our relations with Eng- 
land. I therefore urged it forcibly, as 
otherwise a world war stood at our 
gates. 

In vain. It would be, I was told, wound- 
ing to Austria's dignity, nor would we 
mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. 
We left it to our allies. I was to work 
for the localization of the conflict. It 
naturally only needed a hint from Berlin 
to induce Count Berchtold to content him- 
self with a diplomatic success and put 
up with the Serbian reply. But this hint 
was not given. On the contrary, we 
pressed for war. What a fine success it 
would have been! 

INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS 

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us 
to come forward with a proposal of our 
own. We insisted upon war. I could get 
no other answer [from Berlin] than that 
it was an enormous " concession " on the 
part of Austria to contemplate no an- 
nexation of territory. - 

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed 
out that even without annexations of ter- 
ritory a country can be humiliated and 
subjected, and that Russia would regard 
this as a humiliation which she would not 
stand. 

The impression became ever stronger 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XVII. 



that we desired war in all circumstances. 
Otherwise our attitude in a question 
which, after all, did not directly concern 
us was unintelligible. The urgent ap- 
peals and definite declarations of M. 
Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] 
later on the positively humble telegrams 
of the Czar, the repeated proposals of 
Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuli- 
ano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of 
Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] 
my urgent advice — all were of no use, 
for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia 
must be massacred. 

The more I pressed, the less willing 
they were to alter their course, if only 
because I was not to have the success 
of saving peace in the company of Sir 
Edward Grey. 

So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his 
well-known warning. I replied that I had 
always reported that we should have to 
reckon upon English hostility if it came 
to war with France. The Minister said to 
me repeatedly: " If war breaks out it 
will be the greatest catastrophe the 
world has ever seen." 

GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE 

After that events moved rapidly. When 
Count Berchtold, who hitherto had play- 
ed the strong man on instructions from 
Berlin, at last decided to change his 
course, we answered the Russian mobil- 
ization — after Russia had for a whole 
week negotiated and waited in vain — 
with our ultimatum and declaration of 
war. 

Sir Edward Grey still looked for new 
ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 
1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that 
his chief still hoped to find a way out. 
Should we remain neutral if France did 
the same? I understood him to mean 
that we should then be ready to spare 
France, but his meaning was that we 
should remain absolutely neutral— neu- 
tral therefore even toward Russia. That 
was the well-known misunderstanding. 
Sir Edward had given me an appoint- 
ment for the afternoon, but as he was 
then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he 
called me up on the telephone, after Sir 
W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. 
But in the afternoon he spoke no longer 



of anything but Belgian neutrality, and 
of the possibility that we and France 
should face one another armed, without 
attacking one another. 

Thus there was no proposal whatever, 
but a question without any obligation, 
because our conversation, as I have al- 
ready explained, was to take place soon 
afterward. In Berlin, however — without 
waiting for the conversation — this news 
was used as the foundation for a far- 
reaching act. Then came Poincare's let- 
ter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram 
from the King of the Belgians. The hes- 
itating members of the Cabinet were con- 
verted, with the exception of three mem- 
bers, who resigned. 

PEACE HOPES DESTROYED 

Up to the last moment I had hoped 
for a waiting attitude on the part of 
England. My French colleague also felt 
himself by no means secure, as I learned 
from a private source. As late as Aug. 
1 the King replied evasively to the 
French President. But in the telegram 
from Berlin, which announced the threat- 
ening danger of war, England was al- 
ready mentioned as an opponent. In 
Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned 
upon war with England. 

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey 
received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I 
had gone there at his desire. He was 
deeply moved. He said to me that he 
would always be ready to mediate, and, 
" We don't want to crush Germany." 
Unfortunately, this confidential conver- 
sation was published. Thereby Herr von 
Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last 
possibility of reaching peace via England. 

Our departure was thoroughly digni- 
fied and calm. Before we left, the King 
had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, 
to me, to express his regret at my de- 
parture and that he could not see me 
personally. Princess Louise wrote to me 
that the whole family lamented our go- 
ing. Mrs. Asquith and other friends 
came to the embassy to say good-bye. 

A special train took us to Harwich, 
where a guard of honor was drawn up 
for me. I was treated like a departing 
sovereign. Thus ended my London mis- 
sion. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy 



XVIII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



of the British, but by the perfidy of our 
policy. 

At the railway station in London 
Count Mensdorff [Austrian Ambassa- 
dor] appeared with his staff. He was 
cheerful, and gave me to understand 
that perhaps he would remain in London. 
But to the English he said that it was 
not Austria, but we, who had wanted 
the war. 

A BITTER RETROSPECT 

When now, after two years, I realize 
everything in retrospect, I say to myself 
that I realized too late that there was no 
place for me in a system which for years 
has lived only on tradition and routine, 
and which tolerates only representatives 
who report what one wants to read. Ab- 
sence of prejudice and an independent 
judgment are combated, want of ability 
and of character are extolled and es- 
teemed, but successes arouse hostility and 
uneasiness. 

I had abandoned opposition to, our mad 
Triple Alliance policy, because I saw 
that it was useless and that my warnings 
were represented as Austrophobia and an 
idee fixe. In a policy which is not mere 
gymnastics, or playing with documents, 
but the conduct of the business of the 
firm, there is no such thing as likes and 
dislikes ; there is nothing but the interest 
of the community; but a policy which is 
based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, 
and Turks must end in hostility to Rus- 
sia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe. 

In spite of former aberrations, every- 
thing was still possible in July, 1914. 
Agreement with England had been 
reached. We should have had to send 
to Petersburg a representative who, at 
any rate, reached the average standard 
of political ability, and we should have 
had to give Russia the certainty that 
we desired neither to dominate the 
Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sa- 
zonoff was saying to us: " Lachez l'Au- 
triche et nous lacherons les Francais," 
and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in 
Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: " Vous 
n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche 
partout." 

We needed neither alliances nor wars, 
but merely treaties which would protect 



us and others, and which would guarantee 
us an economic development for which 
there had been no precedent in history. 
And if Russia had been relieved of trouble 
in the west, she would have been able to 
turn again to the east, and then the 
Anglo-Russian antagonism would have 
arisen automatically without our inter- 
ference — and the Russo-Japanese antag- 
onism no less than the Anglo-Russian. 

We could also have approached the 
question of limitation of armaments, 
and should have had no further need to 
bother about the confusions of Austria. 
Austria-Hungary would then become the 
vassal of the German Empire — without 
an alliance, and, above all, without senti- 
mental services on our part, leading ulti- 
mately to war for the liberation of Poland 
and the destruction of Serbia, although 
German interests demanded exactly the 
contrary. 

I had to support in London a policy 
which I knew to be fallacious. I was 
punished for it, for it was a sin against 
the Holy Ghost. 

ARRIVAL AT BERLIN 

On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once 
that I was to be made the scapegoat for 
the catastrophe of which our Government 
had made itself guilty in opposition to 
my advice and my warnings. 

The report was persistently circulated 
by official quarters that I had let myself 
be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because 
if he had not wanted war Russia would 
not have mobilized. Count Pourtales, 
whose reports could be relied upon, was 
to be spared, if only because of his 
family connections. He was said to have 
behaved " splendidly," and he was en- 
thusiastically praised, while I was all the 
more sharply blamed. 

" What has Russia got to do with Ser- 
bia? " this statesman said to me after 
eight years of official activity in Peters- 
burg. It was made out that the whole 
business was a perfidious British^ trick 
which I had not understood. In the For- 
eign Office I was told that in 1916 it 
would in any case have cjome to war. But 
then Russia would have been " ready," 
and so it was better now. 

As appears from all official publica- 



LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XIX. 



tions, without the facts being contro- 
verted by our own White Book, which, 
owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes 
a grave self-accusation: 

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to 
attack Serbia, although no German inter- 
est was involved, and the danger of a 
world war must have been known to us 
— whether we knew the text of the ulti- 
matum is a question of complete indif- 
ference. 

2. In the days between July 23 and 
July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff em- 
phatically declared that Russia could not 
tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we re- 
jected the British proposals of mediation, 
although Serbia, under Russian and Brit- 
ish pressure, had accepted almost the 
whole ultimatum, and although an agree- 
ment about the two points in question 
could easily have been reached, and 
Count Berchtold was even ready to sat- 
isfy himself with the Serbian reply. 

3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold 
wanted to give way, we, without Austria 
having been attacked, replied to Russia's 
mere mobilization by sending an ulti- 
matum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we 
declared war on the Russians, although 
the Czar had pledged his word that as 
long as negotiations continued not a man 
should march — so that we deliberately 
destroyed the possibility of a peaceful 
settlement. 

In view- of these indisputable facts, it 
is not surprising that the whole civilized 
world outside Germany attributes to us 
the sole guilt for the world war. 

GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT 

Is it not intelligible that our enemies 
declare that they will not rest until a 
system is destroyed which constitutes a 
permanent threatening of our neighbors ? 
Must they not otherwise fear that in a 
few years they will again have to take 
up arms, and again see their provinces 
overrun and their towns and villages de- 
stroyed? Were these people not right 
who prophesied that the spirit of 
Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the 
German people — the spirit which glorifies 
war as an aim in itself and does not 
abhor it as an evil; that among us it 
is still the feudal knights and Junkers 



and the caste of warriors who rule and 
who fix our ideals and our values — not 
the civilian gentleman; that the love of 
dueling, which inspires our youth at the 
universities, lives on in those who guide 
the fortunes of the people? Had not 
the events at Zabern and the Parlia- 
mentary debates on that case shown for- 
eign countries how civil rights and free- 
doms are valued among us, when ques- 
tions of military power are on the other 
side? 

Cramb, a historian who has since died, 
an admirer of Germany, put the German 
point of view into the words of 
Euphorion : 

Traumt Ihr den Friedenstag? 
Traume, wer traumen mag ! 
Krieg ist das Losungswort! 
Sieg, und so klingt es fort. 

Militarism, really a school for the na- 
tion and an instrument of policy, makes 
policy into the instrument of military 
power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a 
soldier-kingdom renders possible an at- 
titude which would not be permitted by 
a democracy which had disengaged itself 
from military- junker influences. 

That is what our enemies think, and 
that is what they are bound to think, 
when they see that, in spite of capitalis- 
tic industrialization, and in spite of so- 
cialistic organization, the living, as Fried- 
rich Nietzsche says, are still governed 
by the dead. The principal war aim of 
our enemies, the democratization of Ger- 
many, will be achieved. 

JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE 

Today, after two years of the war, 
there can be no further doubt that we 
cannot hope for an unconditional victory 
over Russians, English, French, Italians, 
Rumanians, and Americans, and that we 
cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our 
enemies. But we can reach a compro- 
mised peace only upon the basis of the 
evacuation of the occupied territories, the 
possession of which in any case signifies 
for us a burden and weakness and the 
peril of new wars. Consequently, every- 
thing should be avoided which hinders a 
change of course on the part of those 
enemy groups which might perhaps still 
be won over to the idea of compromise — 
the British Radicals and the Russian 



XX. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



Reactionaries. Even from this point of 
view our Polish project is just as objec- 
tionable as any interference with Belgian 
rights, or the execution of British citi- 
zens — to say nothing of the mad sub- 
marine war scheme. 

Our future lies upon the water. True, 
but it therefore does not lie in Poland 
and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That 
is a reversion to the Holy Roman Em- 
pire, to the aberrations of the Hohen- 
staufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy 
of the Plantagenets, not the policy of 
Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. 

RUINOUS RESULTS 

Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into 
the past, a revolt from the future, from 
imperialism, from world policy. Central 
Europe is mediaevalism ; Berlin-Bagdad 
is a cul de sac, and not a road into the 
open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the 
world mission of the German people. 

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, 
or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I 
am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance 
policy, which was bound to divert us from 
our aims, and to bring us on to the slop- 
ing plane of Continental policy. It was 
not German policy, but Austrian dynas- 
tic policy. The Austrians had accus- 
tomed themselves to regard the alliance 
as a shield, under whose protection they 
could make excursions at pleasure into 
the East. 

And what result have we to expect 



from the struggle of peoples? The 
United States of Africa will be British, 
like the United States of America, of 
Australia, and of Oceania, and the Latin 
States of Europe, as I said years ago, 
will fall into the same relationship to 
the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters 
of America to the United States. They 
will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; 
France, exhausted by the war, will link 
herself still more closely to Great Brit- 
ain. In the long run, Spain also will not 
resist. 

In Asia, the Russian and Japanese will 
expand their borders and their customs, 
and the south will remain to the British. 

The world will belong to the Anglo- 
Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, 
and the German will remain alone with 
Austria and Hungary. His sphere of 
power will be that of thought and of 
trade, not that of the bureaucrats and 
the soldiers. The German appeared too 
late, and the world war has destroyed 
the last possibility of catching up the 
lost ground, of founding a colonial em- 
pire. 

For we shall not supplant the sons of 
Japheth; the program of the great 
Rhodes, who saw the salvation of man- 
kind in British expansion and British 
imperialism, will be realized. 
Tu reg-ere imperio populos Romano, memento. 
Hae tibi erunt artes : pacisque imponere 

morem, 
Parcere subjectis et debellare s\iperbos. 



Krupp Director Confirms Prince 
Lichnowsky's Indictment 



COINCIDENT with the publication in 
Germany of the famous memoran- 
dum of Prince Lichnowsky squarely 
putting the blame for the outbreak of the 
world war upon the Kaiser and the Ger- 
man militarists, there also appeared in 
circular form in Germany a letter writ- 
ten by a certain Dr. Muhlon, a former 
member of the Krupp Directorate now 
living in Switzerland, corroborating the 
charges made by the Prince. The Muhlon 
letter was briefly referred to in an offi- 
cial dispatch from Switzerland received 



in Washington on March 29 as having 
produced an animated discussion 
throughout the empire. 

A copy of the Leipziger Volkszeitung 
of March 20 tells how, in a discussion of 
the Lichnowsky and Muhlon memoranda 
before the Main Committee of the Reichs- 
tag on March 16, Vice Chancellor von 
Payer tried to minimize the value of Dr. 
Miihlon's statements by asserting that 
the former Krupp Director was a sick, 
nervous man. who no doubt did not intend 
to injure his country's cause, but who 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXI. 



was hardly responsible for his actions be- 
cause of his many nervous breakdowns. 
Later, the Berliner Tageblatt printed the 
text of Dr. Miihlon's letter, which was 
evidently written before the resignation 
of Dr. Karl Helfferich as Vice Chancel- 
lor last November. As translated by The 
London Times, Dr. Miihlon's memoran- 
dum reads: 

TALK WITH HELFFERICH 

"In the middle of July, 1914, I had, 
as I frequently had, a conversation with 
Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the 
Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice 
Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had 
adopted a negative attitude toward cer- 
tain large transactions in Bulgaria and 
Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for 
business reasons — delivery of war mate- 
rial — had a lively interest. As one of 
the reasons to justify the attitude of 
the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich 
finally gave me the following reason: 

" The political situation has become very 
menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in 
any case wait before entering into any 
further engagements abroad, The Aus- 
trians have just been with the Kaiser. 
In a week's time Vienna will send a very 
severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very 
short interval for the answer. The ulti- 
matum will contain demands such as 
punishment of a number of officers, dis- 
solution of political associations, criminal 
investigation in Serbia by Austrian offi- 
cials, and, in fact, a whole series of 
definite satisfactions will be demanded at 
once ; otherwise Austria-Hungary will 
declare war on Serbia. 

" Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser 
had expressed his decided approval of 
this procedure on the part of Austria- 
Hungary. He had said that he regarded 
a conflict with Serbia as an internal af- 
fair between these two countries, in 
which he would permit no other State to 
interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would 
mobilize also. But in his case mobiliza- 
tion meant immediate war. This time 
there would be no oscillation. Helfferich 
said that the Austrians were extremely 
well satisfied at this determined attitude 
on the part of the Kaiser. 

" When I thereupon said to Dr. Helf- 
ferich that this uncanny communication 
converted my fears of a world war, 
which were already strong, into abso- 



lute certainty, he replied that it cer- 
tainly looked like that. But perhaps 
France and Russia would reconsider the 
matter. In any case, the Serbs deserved 
a lesson which they would remember. 
This was the first intimation that I had 
received about the Kaiser's discussions 
with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's 
particularly intimate relations with 
the personages who were sure to be ini- 
tiated, and I knew that his communica- 
tion was trustworthy. 

KAISER FOR WAR 

" After my return from Berlin I in- 
formed Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Hal- 
bach, one of whose Directors I then was 
at Essen. Dr. Helfferich had given me 
permission and at that time the intention 
was to make him a Director of Krupps. 
Herr von Bohlen seemed disturbed that 
Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such 
information, and he made a remark to 
the effect that the Government people 
can never keep their mouths shut. He 
then told me the following. He said 
that he had himself been with the Kaiser 
in the last few days. The Kaiser had 
spoken to him also of his conversation 
with the Austrians, and of its result; 
but he had described the matter as so se- 
cret that he [Krupp] would not even 
have dared to inform his own Directors. 
As, however, I already knew, he could 
tell me that Helfferich's statements were 
accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to 
know more details than he did. He said 
that the situation was really very seri- 
ous. The Kaiser had told him that he 
would declare war immediately if Rus- 
sia mobilized, and that this time people 
would see that he did not turn about. 
The Kaiser's repeated insistence that 
this time nobody would be able to accuse 
him of indecision had, he said, been al- 
most comic in its effect. 

GERMAN DUPLICITY 

" On the very day indicated to me by 
Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to 
Serbia appeared. At this time I was 
again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich 
that I regarded the tone and contents 
of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. 
Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the 



XXII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



note only had that ring in the German 
translation. He had seen the ultimatum 
in French, and in French it really could 
not be regarded as overdone. On this 
occasion Helfferich also said to me that 
the Kaiser had gone on his northern 
cruise only as a ' blind '; he had not ar- 
ranged the cruise on the usual extensive 
scale, but was remaining close at hand 
and keeping in constant touch. Now one 
must simply wait and see what would 
happen. The Austrians, who, of course, 
did not expect the ultimatum to be ac- 
cepted, were really acting rapidly before 
the other powers could find time to 
interfere. The Deutsche Bank had 
already made its arrangements, so as to 
be prepared for all eventualities. For 
example, it was no longer paying out the 
gold which came in. That could easily be 
done without attracting notice, and the 
amount day by day reached considerable 
sums. 

" Immediately after the Vienna ulti- 
matum to Serbia the German Govern- 
ment issued declarations to the effect 
that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, 
without Germany's previous knowledge. 
When one attempted to reconcile these 
declarations with the events mentioned 
above, the only possible explanation was 
that the Kaiser had tied himself down 
without inviting the co-operation of his 
Government, and that, in the conversa- 
tions with the Austrians, the Germans 
took care not to agree upon the text of 
the ultimatum. For I have already shown 
that the contents of the ultimatum were 
pretty accurately known in Germany. 

" Herr Krupp von Bohlen, with whom 
I spoke about these German declarations 
— which, at any rate in their effect, were 
lies — was also by no means edified. For, 
as he said, Germany ought not, in such a 
tremendous affair, to have given a blank 
check to a State like Austria; and it was 
the duty of the leading statesmen to de- 
mand, both of the Kaiser and of our al- 
lies, that the Austrian claims and the ul- 
timatum to Serbia should be discussed in 
minute detail and definitely decided upon, 
and also that we should decide upon the 
precise program of our further proceed- 
ings. He said that, whatever point of 
view one took, we ought not to give our- 



selves into the hands of the Austrians 
and expose ourselves to eventualities 
which had not been reckoned out in ad- 
vance. One ought to have connected ap- 
propriate conditions with our obligations. 
In short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the 
German denial of previous knowledge, if 
there was any trace of truth in it, as an 
offense against the elementary princi- 
ples of diplomacy; and he told me that 
he intended to speak in this sense to 
Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, 
who was a special friend of his. 

GERMAN GOVERNMENT BLAMED 

" As a result of this conversation Herr 
von Bohlen told me that Herr von Jagow 
stuck firmly to his assertion that he had 
had nothing to do with the text of the 
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that 
Germany had never made any such de- 
mands. In reply to the objection that this 
was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow re- 
plied that he, as a diplomatist, had 
naturally thought of making such a de- 
mand. When, however, Herr von Jagow 
was occupying himself with the matter 
and was called in, the Kaiser had so 
committed himself that it was too late 
for any procedure according to diplo- 
matic custom, and there was nothing 
more to be done. The situation was such 
that it would have been impossible to 
intervene with drafting proposals. In the 
end, he [Jagow] had thought that non- 
interference would have its advantages — 
namely, the good impression which could 
be made in Petersburg and Paris with the 
German declaration that Germany had 
not co-operated in the preparation of the 
Vienna ultimatum." 

A REMARKABLE LETTER 

Herr Muhlon authorized the Humanite, 
a Paris Socialist paper, through its 
Swiss correspondent, to publish the fol- 
lowing remarkable letter which he ad- 
dressed from Berne, on May 7, 1917, to 
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then Im- 
perial Chancellor: 

" However great the number and 
weight of the mistakes accumulated on 
the German side since the beginning of 
the war, I nevertheless persisted for a 
long time in the belief that a belated 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXIII. 



foresight would at last dawn upon the 
minds of our Directors. It was with this 
hope that I put myself to a certain ex- 
tent at your disposal, in order to col- 
laborate with you in Rumania, and that I 
indicated to you that I was disposed to 
help in Switzerland, where I am living at 
present, if the object of our efforts was 
to be rapprochement of the enemy par- 
ties. That I was, and that I remain, 
hostile to any activity other than recon- 
ciliation and restoration I proved soon 
after the opening of hostilities by the 
definite resignation of my Directorship 
of Krupps' works. 

" But since the first days of 1917 I 
have abandoned all hope as regards the 
present Directors of Germany. Our offer 
of peace without indication of our war 
aims, the accentuation of the submarine 
war, the deportations of Belgians, the 
systematic destruction in France, and 
the torpedoing of English hospital ships 
have so degraded the Governors of the 
German Empire that I am profoundly 
convinced that they are disqualified for- 
ever for the elaboration and conclusion 
of a sincere and just agreement. The 
personalities may change, but they can- 
not remain the representatives of the 
German cause. 

" The German people will not be able 
to repair the grievous crimes committed 



gainst its own present and future, and 
against that of Europe and the whole 
human race until it is represented by 
different men with a different mentality. 
To tell the truth, it is mere justice that 
its reputation throughout the whole 
world is as bad as it is. The triumph 
of its methods — the methods by which 
it has hitherto conducted the war both 
militarily and politically — would consti- 
tute a defeat for the ideas and the su- 
preme hopes of mankind. One has only 
to imagi^- that a people exhausted, de- 
moralized, or hating violence, should con- 
sent to a peace with a Government 
which has conducted such a war, in order 
to understand how the general level and 
the chances of life of the peoples would 
remain black and deceptive. 

" As a man and as a German who 
desires nothing but the welfare of the 
deceived and tortured German people, I 
turn away definitely from the present 
representatives of the German regime. 
And I have only one wish — that all inde- 
pendent men may do the same and that 
many Germans may understand and act. 

" In view of the fact that it is im- 
possible for me at present to make any 
manifestation before German public 
opinion, I have thought it to be my abso- 
lute duty to inform your Excellency of 
my point of view." 



Reichstag Debate on Lichnowsky 



THE Main Committee of the Reichstag 
dealt with Prince Lichnowsky' s memo- 
randum on March 16. Herr von Payer, 
Vice Chancellor, stated that Prince Lich- 
nowsky himself on March 15 made a state- 
ment to the Imperial Chancellor, in which he 
said : 

" Your Excellency knows that the purely 
private notes which I wrote down in the 
Summer of 1916 found their way into wider 
circles by an unprecedented breach of confi- 
dence. It was mainly a question of subject- 
ive considerations about our entire foreign 
policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived 
in the policy hitherto pursued of repelling- (in 
der seitherigen Abkehr) Russia and in the 
extension of the policy of alliances to Oriental 
questions the real roots of the world war. I 
then submitted our Morocco naval policy to 
a brief examination. My London mission 
could at the same time not remain out of 



consideration, especially as I felt the need in 
regard to the future and with a view to my 
own justification of noting the details of my 
experiences and impressions there before they 
vanished from my memory. These notes 
were intended in a certain degree only for 
family archives, and I wrote them down 
without documentary material or notes from 
the period of my official activity. I consid- 
ered I might show them, on the assurance of 
absolute secrecy, to a very few politicial 
friends in whose judgment as well as trust- 
worthiness I had equal confidence." 

Lichnowsky Resigns Rank 

Prince Lichnowsky then described in his 
letter how the memorandum, owing to an in- 
discretion, got into circulation, and finally 
expressed lively regret at such an extremely 
vexatious incident. 

Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnow- 



XXIV. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



sky had meanwhile tendered his resignation 
of his present rank, which had been accepted, 
and as he had doubtless no bad intention, 
but had simply been guilty of imprudence, 
no fui'ther steps would be taken against him. 
The Vice Chancellor proceeded : 

" Some assertions in his documents must, 
however, be contradicted, especially his as- 
sertions about political events in the last 
months preceding the war. Prince Lichnow- 
sky was not of his own knowledge acquainted 
with these events, but he apparently received 
from a third, and wrongly informed quarter, 
inaccurate information. The key to the mis- 
takes and false conclusions may also be the 
Prince's overestimation of his own services, 
which are accompanied by hatred against 
those who do not recognize his achievements 
as he expected. The entire memorandum, is 
penetrated by a striking veneration for for- 
eign diplomats, especially the British, who 
are described in a truly affectionate manner, 
and, on the other hand, by an equally strik- 
ing irritation against almost all German 
statesmen. The result was that the Prince 
frequently regarded Germany's most zealous 
enemy as her best friend because they were 
personally on good terms with him. 

" The fact that, as he admits, he attached 
at first no great importance to the assassina- 
tion of the heir to the Austrian throne, and 
was displeased that the situation- was judged 
otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the 
Prince had no clear judgment for the events 
that followed and their import." 

The Vice Chancellor then characterized as 
false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions 
about General von Moltke's urging war at 
the Potsdam Crown Council" of June 5, 1914, 
and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol on 
" this alleged Crown Council " to Count 
Mensdorff, containing the postscript that it 
would be no great harm even if war with 
Russia arose out of it. 

Payer's Defense 

Herr von Payer also denied the statement 
that the then Foreign Secretary was in 
Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that 
Count von Pourtales, the German Ambassa- 
dor in Petrograd, had reported that Russia 
would in no circumstances move. The Suk- 
homlinoff trial had shown how unfounded 
were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against 
Germany for replying to the Russian mobili- 
zation by an ultimatum and a declaration of 
war. It was also false to assert that the 
German Government rejected all Great Brit- 
ain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last 
mediation proposal was very urgently sup- 
ported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the 
memorandum was obvious. It was to show 
the reader how much better and more intelli- 
gent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was, and 
how he could have assured the peace of the 
empire if his advice had been followed. 
The Vice Chancellor continued : 
" Nobody will reproach the Prince with this 
belief in himself. He was also free to make 



notes about events, and his attitude toward 
them, but he should then have considered it 
a duty that his views should not have be- 
come known to the public, and, no matter 
how small his circle of readers was, it was 
his duty to state nothing contradicting facts 
which he knew. As things now are, the 
memorandum will cause enough harm among 
malevolent and superficial people. The mem- 
orandum has no historical value whatever." 
Referring to a manifolded copy of a letter 
from Dr. Miihlon, who is at present in Switz- 
erland, and at the outbreak of war was on 
Krupps' Board of Directors, Herr von Payer 
said that the letter related to the utterances 
of two highly placed gentlemen from which 
he drew the conclusion that the German Gov- 
ernment in July, 1914, lacked a desire for 
peace. Both these gentlemen had stated in 
writing that Dr. Miihlon had suffered from 
nerves, and he (Herr von Payer) also took 
the view that his statements were those of a 
man of diseased mind. 

In the discussion that followed, Herr 
Scheidemann said that the Socialist Party 
regarded imperialism as the fundamental 
cause of the war. Prince Lichnowsky's 
memorandum, in which he attempted to put 
the blame for the war on Germany, could, 
in his opinion, only make an impression on 
so-called out-and-out pacifists. 

Herr Muller-Meiningen said that, notwith- 
standing what Dr. Miihlon and Prince Lich- 
nowsky had said, he was absolutely con- 
vinced that the overwhelming majority of 
the German people, the Chancellor, and the 
representatives of the Foreign Office, and, 
above all, the German Emperor, always de- 
sired peace. 

Herr Stresemann expressed a desire to see 
the last White Book supplemented. Prince 
Lichnowsky's memorandum could not be 
taken seriously. 

Herr von Payer, intervening, said that the 
question as to whether criminal or disciplin- 
ary action might be taken against Prince 
Lichnowsky was considered by the Imperial 
Department of Justice. The result was that, 
on various legal grounds, neither a prosecu- 
tion of the Prince for diplomatic high trea- 
son in the sense of Paragraph 92 of the Penal 
Code, nor proceedings under Paragraph 89 or 
Paragraph 353, the so-called Arnim para- 
graph, would have offered any chance of 
success. After the Prince's retirement, there 
was no longer any question of disciplinary 
proceedings against him. The Prince has 
been prohibited by the Foreign Office from 
publishing articles in the press. 

Lichnowsky's " Optimism " 

Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for For- 
eign Affairs, replying to a question as to 
who was responsible for Prince Lichnowsky's 
appointment in London-, said that the ap- 
pointment was made by the Kaiser, in agree- 
ment with the responsible Imperial Chan- 
cellor. While in London the Prince had de- 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXV. 



voted himself zealously to his task. His 
views, it was true, had frequently not agreed 
with those of the German Foreign Office. 
That was especially the case regarding his 
strong optimism in reference to German- 
English relations. When his hopes aiming at 
a German-English understanding were de- 
stroyed by the war, the Prince returned to 
Germany greatly excited, and even then did 
not restrain his criticism of Germany's pol- 
icy. 

Herr von Stumm continued : 

" His excitement increased owing to attacks 
against him in the German press. All these 
circumstances must be taken into considera- 
tion when gauging the value of his memoran- 
dum. It was unjustifiable to draw conclu- 
sions from it regarding the Ambassador's 
activity in London and blame the Govern- 
ment for it. Regarding the German White 
Book, the Under Secretary admitted that it 
was not very voluminous, but it had to be 
compiled quickly, so as to present to the 
Reichstag at the opening a clear picture of 
the question of guilt. The Blue Books of 
other States, it was true, were much more 
voluminous. The German White Book, how- 
ever, differed from them in so far to its ad- 
vantage as it contained no falsification. A 
new edition of the German White Book is in 
preparation." 

Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of 
Dr. Muhlon, at present in Switzerland. Dr. 
Muhlon, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made 
a statement according to which he had a 
conference with two exalted personages in 



the latter half of July, 1914, from which it ap- 
peared that it was not the intention of the 
German Government to maintain peace. The 
Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Muhlon was 
suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and 
that no importance could be attached to his 
revelations, since the two gentlemen referred 
to had denied making the statements attrib- 
uted to them. 

In the subsequent discussion disapproval 
of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was ex- 
pressed, but some speakers urged the need 
for the reorganization of Germany's Diplo- 
matic Service. 

According to the report of the debate pub- 
lished in the Neues Wiener Journal, Her/ von 
Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the 
war German diplomacy had made some bad 
blunders, and that reform was urgently 
needed. Herr Miiller (Progressive) sharply 
criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German 
Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the 
war, and charged him with having declared 
to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian 
Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy 
no casus foederis. Prince Billow also came 
in for severe criticism. 

A bill indicting Prince Lichnowsky for trea- 
son has been introduced into the Reichstag 
and is still pending at this writing. A dis- 
patch from Geneva on April 21 stated that 
he was virtually a prisoner in his chateau in 
Silesia. According to the Diisseldorfer Tage- 
blatt the Prince was under police surveillance 
because of the discovery of a plan for his 
escape to Switzerland. 



Comments of German Publicists 



IMMEDIATELY following the sending out 
by the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bu- 
reau on March 19 of an account of the 
discussion in the Main Committee of the 
Reichstag on March 16 of the Lichnowsky 
memorandum, together with excerpts from 
that document, the editorial writers of the 
German newspapers began emptying vials of 
wrath upon the head of the former Ambassa- 
dor in London. With the exception of the 
Socialists and a few Liberal newspapers, the 
press was practically a unit in condemning 
the Prince for his " treasonable and indis- 
creet acts " and in asserting that, although 
his " revelations " might be welcomed with 
shouts of joy in the allied countries, they 
would have no serious effect upon the fight- 
ing spirit of the German Nation. 

In trying to explain what prompted Prince 
Lichnowsky to wite his memorandum for 
" the family archives," nearly all the Ger- 
man editors lay great stress upon his alleged 
personal vanity and his resentment at seeing 
his efforts toward strengthening the bonds 
between England and Germany made a grim 
joke by the outbreak of the world war. The 



Prince is also called a simple-minded person, 
completely taken in by the deceptive courtesy 
of the British diplomats and possessing none 
of the qualifications necessary to make him 
a profitable representative of the Kaiser at 
the Court of St. James's. All through the 
comments, from extreme Pan-German to so- 
cialistic, runs a vein of sarcastic criticism of 
the peculiar " ability " shown by the Ger- 
man Foreign Office in picking its Ambassa- 
dors. 

All the Pan-German and annexationist 
papers take occasion to link up Prince Lich- 
nowsky with Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, the 
former Imperial Chancellor, and make the 
latter responsible for the appointment of the 
" pacifist " Prince. In doing this they renew 
all their old charges of weakness and pacif- 
ism against the ex-Chancellor, and intimate 
that he may be the next German formerly 
occupying a high place in the Government to 
write memoranda for his family archives. 
Some of the papers did not wait to write 
regular editorials about the memorandum, 
but interlarded their reports of the meeting 
of the Reichstag Committee with sarcastic 



XXVI. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



comment and explanations. This was notably 
the case with the Vossische Zeitung, the lead- 
ing exponent of reconciliation with Russia at 
the expense of Great Britain. 

Reventlow Furious 

Although it has since been cabled that the 
Imperial Government was considering taking 
action against Prince Lichnowsky, and that 
Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German 
General Staff, was under arrest for hav- 
ing aided in the distribution of manifolded 
copies of the memorandum, there was no 
general demand in the German press for the 
trial of the Prince on a charge of high trea- 
son. The exceptions were a few extreme 
Pan-German organs, led by Count zu Revent- 
low's Deutsche Tageszeitung. On the other 
hand, a few of the Socialist and Liberal 
papers cautiously remarked that, after all, 
although what the Prince said about the re- 
sponsibility for the war was altogether too 
pro-Entente, it might help the movement in 
Germany for a negotiated peace. 

Count zu Reventlow' s article in the 
Deutsche Tageszeitung read, in part, as fol- 
lows : 

" When a former Ambassador, and an ex- 
perienced diplomat and official besides, writes 
an article and gives it to some one else in 
these times, there is, in our opinion, no ex- 
cuse. It is a case of high treason, and it 
makes little difference if here one might per- 
haps admit the view of its being high treason 
through negligence, because certainly no 
former diplomat and official ought to allow 
himself to be so negligent, and, furthermore, 
he must have known the great danger of his 
action, which, as has been said, was ex- 
clusively meant to be to his personal interest. 
Therefore, we cannot very well understand 
for what reasons the proper steps have not 
been taken already against Prince Lichnow- 
sky. We use the characterization ' high trea- 
son ' after due deliberation. 

" Prince Lichnowsky should not have al- 
lowed a single piece of his article to have left 
his hands, for he was very well able to judge 
that its publication outside of the German 
Empire was bound to have the effect of a 
treasonable act. The German cause will not 
be made any worse because a former diplo- 
mat, completely enchanted by English ways 
and never in touch with the essence of the 
English policy, places himself on the side of 
the enemies of the German Empire." 

The Kolnische Volkszeitung, the organ of 
the annexationist faction of the Centre Party, 
concluded its editorial thus : 

" One thing must be emphasized, Lieb- 
knecht, Dittmann, and other traitors have 
been jailed because of their high treason. 
Lichnowsky wanted to show to the whole 
world with his memorandum that Germany 
had sought, wanted, and begun the war be- 
cause some persons did not wish to have him, 
Prince Lichnowsky,, enjoy the success of the 
Anglo-German friendship. And, in so doing, 



Lichnowsky furnished our enemies with 
weapons, worked to our enemies' advantage. 
In time of war this is treason. The excuse 
that the fourteen copies that he had pre- 
pared were written only for his friends is 
ridiculous. Teodor Wolff of the Berliner 
Tageblatt is known to be one of Lichnow- 
sky's most intimate friends. Who knows 
who the others may be ! If a Social Democrat 
or an anarchist writes an inciting pamphlet 
in the form of a memorandum and doesn't 
distribute it himself, but has his friends do it, 
is he then exempt from punishment? If a 
person commits high treason and does not 
circulate the document himself, but lets oth- 
ers do it, or at least does not take precau- 
tions to see that it is not distributed, does he 
go free? The German people will hardly un- 
derstand the decision of the Imperial De- 
partment of Justice as just rendered in 
favor of Lichnowsky. Even at the last ses- 
sion of the Prussian House of Lords Prince 
Lichnowsky sat beside his friend Dernburg. 
Will he appear in the House of Lords 
again? " 

Germania Waxed Sarcastic 

Germania, speaking for the so-called mod- 
erate section of the Centre Party, called the 
Lichnowsky case " one of the most disturbing 
political events that we have experienced in 
the course of the war," and hoped that the 
courts would still have a chance to decide as 
to the Prince's guilt. The newspaper com- 
ment was, in general, spiced with much sar- 
castic comparison, of the Lichnowsky case 
with the cases of Dr. Karl Liebknecht and 
Deputy Wilhelm Dittmann, and many re- 
marks were passed regarding the difference 
between the treatment accorded to a member 
of the Prussian nobility and that suf- 
fered by commoners and representatives 
of the German working class. The Berliner 
Lokal-Anzeiger, in ending its comment as to 
the paeans of joy with which the enemy 
press would be sure to welcome the publication 
of the Lichnowsky indictment, added the fol- 
lowing item of news : 

" We learn on good authority, in the mat- 
ter of the distribution of the Lichnowsky 
pamphlet, that in the beginning of February 
the police succeeded in seizing 2,000 copies of 
this pamphlet which the Neues Vaterland So- 
ciety had had sent to it from South Germany 
through its business manager, Else Bruck. 
She, together with Henke, a bookseller, was 
placed under charges, but was acquitted by 
the court-martial, presumably because the 
court was not able to foresee the far-reach- 
ing result of the document." 

Under the heading " The Blind Argus " the 
Bremer Nachrichten opined that the man who 
should have been using a thousand eyes in 
London in the interest of Germany was blind, 
and it referred to the. Lichnowsky case as 
" the most gloomy chapter in the history of 
German diplomacy." 

Prince Lfchnowsky's aversion to the old 







LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXVII. 



Triple Alliance drew much caustic criticism, 
especially from the Pan German press, and 
excerpts from the semi-official Vienna Frem- 
denblatt and other Austrian papers, indig- 
nantly repudiating the Prince's charge that 
the Dual Monarchy had always regarded 
Germany as a shield under which it could 
make raids upon the Near East and other- 
wise stir up trouble, were eagerly reprinted 
in Germany. 

The Berlin Vorwarts, speaking for the pro- 
Government Socialists, said : 

" The Ambassador returned with the feel- 
ing of a man who had seen his lifework 
knocked to pieces. No doubt he felt at that 
time not very different from us German So- 
cialists who had also worked for reconcilia- 
tion with Prance and England and how, in 
the face of the unchained elemental forces, 
had to recognize our impotence with gnashing 
of teeth. In Germany, Prince Lichnowsky, 
who had believed in the possibility of agree- 
ment as every toiler must believe in his 
work, was greeted with the scorn of the Pan- 
Germans, who asserted that he had allowed 
himself to be softsoaped by the English 



and had never recognized their real inten- 
tions." * * * 

" And who can deny that this pamphlet 
casts a deep shadow upon the German for- 
eign policy before the war? They can say 
that everything that Lichnowsky writes is the 
result of a diseased imagination and that all 
is distorted and badly drawn. But this would 
merely mean that the most important Am- 
bassadorial post' that Germany had at her 
disposal was occupied by a fool and a block- 
head. So, if one wishes to spare the German 
policy this compromising implication, the only 
thing to do is to take the memorandum and 
its author seriously and argue the points with 
him in an expert manner." 

The Vorwarts concluded its comment by 
saying that, no matter how the war started, 
the German people were now determined to 
see that Germany was not defeated, but if 
Prince Liehnowsky's article would help the 
people of Germany to adopt a more con- 
ciliatory attitude toward England, and thus 
hasten a negotiated peace, it was worth 
reading. Comment of other Socialist papers 
was along the same lines. 



Von Jagow's Two Replies to Lichnowsky 



PRACTICALLY coincident with the giv- 
ing out for publication on March 19, 
through the semi-official "Wolff Tele- 
graph Bureau, of an account of a discussion 
in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of 
the memorandum of the former Ambassador 
at London, together with substantial ex- 
cerpts from the main chapters of his work, 
the German Government got in touch with 
Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for For- 
eign Affairs when the war began, and asked 
him to write an article calculated to counter- 
act the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. 
Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this 
request, but he merely made matters worse 
for the German Government by practically 
admitting the correctness of Prince Lieh- 
nowsky's assertion that England did not 
want war and that Berlin was aware of this. 
Copies of German newspapers received here 
show that, while the journals of all factions 
were practically of one mind in reproaching 
the German Foreign Office for its lack of 
diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and mil- 
itarist organs laid special stress upon the 
implication in the von Jagow article that 
Germany might have been willing to drop 
its alliance with Austria if it could have been 
sure of contracting one with England, and 
the Liberal and Socialist papers declared 
that it was no use insisting any longer that 
Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale 
bloodshed of the world war, and that now 
nothing really stood in the way of moving 
for a peace by agreement. 
These comments were so sharp on both 



sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved 
to write another article defending his reply 
to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his 
statements regarding the Triple Alliance 
could by no means be interpreted as meaning 
that he would have been willing to abandon 
Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. 
In this article, which was first printed in 
the Miinchener Neueste Nachrichten, von 
Jagow says he cannot understand how these 
statements can be taken to mean that he 
was an opponent of the alliance with Aus- 
tria and was considering a choice between 
Austria and England. He proceeds to defend 
his own policy by reference to the fact that 
Bismarck was not content with the Triple 
Alliance on the one hand, and the famous 
" Reinsurance Treaty " with Russia on the 
other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted 
agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
and England, with the object of " bringing 
England into a closer relationship to the 
Central European league and making her 
share its burdens." Bismarck's policy re- 
lieved Germany of some of her obligations, 
because " Austria-Hungary, supported by 
Italy and England, held the balance against 
Russia." 

Then, as The London Times points out, 
carefully avoiding the history of the present 
Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and 
abandonment of the " Reinsurance Treaty " 
with Russia, von Jagow defends his at- 
tempts to make British policy serve Ger- 
many's purposes. It was " because of the 
isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had 



XXVIII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



come about in th i course of years," that von 
Jagow " pursued a rapprochement with Eng- 
land." He did so, " not with any idea of 
putting England in the place of Austria- 
Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the 
Anglo-German antagonism, to move England 
to a different orientation of her policy." 
Germany " could not count upon Italy," and 
wanted other assistance in upholding Aus- 
tria-Hungary in the Balkans against Rus- 
sia. Herr von Jagow proceeds : 

" The combination of England would have 
relieved us of the necessity of taking our 
stand alone, when the case arose, for Aus- 
tria-Hungary against Russia. As was ef- 
fected by the agreements of 1887, a part of 
our obligations would have been laid upon 
other shoulders. It is in this sense that I 
spoke of the possibility of the loosening and 
the dissolution of old unions which no longer 
satisfy all the conditions. 

" The alliance with Austria-Hungary was 
the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and 
that it had to remain. The expansion of the 
alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in 
Italy, was a means of supplementing the 
Central European grouping of the powers ; 
it was an ' auxiliary structure,' by means 
of which Bismarck aimed at a further guar- 
antee of peace, especially as he intended 
thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. 
Threads then ran to England via Italy. These 
threads gave way later, and this caused 
a considerable change in the attitude of 
Italy. 

Friendly to England 

" A friendly attitude on the part of Eng- 
land toward the Triple Alliance— what Pro- 
fessor Hermann Oncken calls the moral ex- 
tension of the Triple Alliance over the Chan- 
nel — was the aim of our policy, and in this 
we were sure of the complete accord of our 
allies. I never thought that the agreements 
about Bagdad and the colonies would mean 
an immediate alteration of England's course 
in European policy. These agreements were 
to prepare the way for this change of course. 



I was under no illusions about the difficulties 
which would still have to be oyercome. But 
difficulties, and even resistance on the part 
of public opinion in one's own country, can- 
not prevent us from following a road that 
is seen to be right. The league between Ger- 
many and Austria-Hungary, supported by 
friendship with England, would have created 
a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The 
increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction 
with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russo- 
phile and also Irredentist tendencies of Ru- 
mania, would have lost their importance. 
Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alli- 
ance treaty might have been modified. The 
union with England would also have secured 
us against Russian aggression, and the obli- 
gations imposed upon us by our alliance 
would thereby have been diminished. 

" The road to this goal was long. The calm 
development was crossed by the Serajevo 
murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 
1914, the English Government — instead of 
keeping peace — preferred to join in the war 
against us. The English Government has 
probably since then been assailed by serious 
doubts as to whether its choice was right. 
In any case, it assumed a considerable share 
of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe." 

Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme 
was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that 
the policy of England is more liable to adap- 
tation and alteration than the policy of any 
other country, and that " more far-seeing 
statesmen than those who were intrusted with 
the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914 — 
think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salis- 
burys— held other views about the orientation 
of England toward Germany and Russia." 

" As matters stand today, attempts to ar- 
rive at clearness about the respective parts 
played by our enemies at the outbreak of the 
war, and about the greater or less degrees 
of guilt belonging to each of them, can have 
only a historical value. England has made 
the cause of our enemies her own, and so she 
also shall be made to feel how Germany de- 
fends herself against her enemies." 



Full Text of von Jagow's First Reply 



[Copyrig-hted] 



Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince 
Lichnowsky , which was printed in the Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, fol- 
lows : 

SO far as it is possible, in general, I 
shall refrain from taking up the state- 
ments concerning the policy obtaining 
before my administration of the Foreign 
Office. 

" I should like to make the following re- 
marks about the individual points in the 
article : 



"When I was named State Secretary in 
January, 1913, I regarded a German-English 
rapprochement as desirable and also be- 
lieved an agreement attainable on the points 
where our interests touched or crossed each 
other. At all events, I wanted to try to 
work in this sense. A principal point for us 
was the Mesopotamia- Asia Minor question — 
the so-called Bagdad policy — as this had be- 
come for us a question of prestige. If Eng- 
land wanted to force us out there it certainly 
appeared to me that a conflict could hardly 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXIX. 



be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it 
was possible to do so, to negotiate over the 
Bagdad Railroad. "We found a favorable 
disposition on the part of the English Gov- 
ernment, and the result was the agreement 
that was almost complete when the world 
war broke out. 

Colonial Questions 

" At the same time the negotiations over 
the Portuguese colonies that had been begun 
by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassa- 
dor at London,) continued by Baron Mar- 
schall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky 
were under way. I intended to carve the 
way later for further negotiations regarding 
other — for example, East Asiatic — problems, 
when what was in my opinion the most im- 
portant problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, 
should be settled, and an atmosphere of more 
confidence thus created. I also left the naval 
problem aside, as it would have been diffi- 
cult to reach an early agreement over 
that matter, after past experiences. 

" I can pass over the development of the 
Albanian problem, as it occurred before my 
term of office began. In general, however, 
I would like to remark that such far-reach- 
ing disinterestedness in Balkan questions as 
Prince (Lichnowsky proposes does not seem 
possible to me. It would have contradicted 
the essential part of the alliance if we had 
completely ignored really vital interests of 
our ally. We, too, had demanded that Aus- 
tria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that 
time Italy's attitude had caused serious re- 
sentment among us. Russia, although she 
had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood 
by France. Finally, it was our task, as the 
third member of the alliance, to support such 
measures as would render possible a settle- 
ment of the divergent interests of our allies 
and avoid a conflict between them. 

" It further appeared impossible to me not 
to pursue a ' triple alliance policy ' in mat- 
ters where the interests of the allied powers 
touched each other. Then Italy would have 
been driven entirely into line with the En- 
tente in questions of the Orient, and Austria 
handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the 
Triple Alliance would thus have really gone 
to pieces. And we, too, would not have been 
able to look after our interests in the 
Orient, if we did not have some support. 
And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny 
that we had to represent great economic in- 
terests right there. But today economic in- 
terests are no longer to be separated from 
political interests. 

" That the people ' in Petrograd wanted 
to see the Sultan independent ' is an asser- 
tion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be 
able to prove ; it would contradict every tra- 
dition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, 
had not had at our command the influence 
at Constantinople founded by Baron Mar- 
schall, it would hardly have been possible 



for us to defend our economic interests 
in Turkey in the desired way. 

Russia and Germany 

" When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts 
that we only ' drove Russia, our natural 
friend and best neighbor, into the arms of 
France and England through our Oriental 
and Balkan policy ' he is in conflict with the 
historical facts. Only because Prince Gort- 
schakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Rus- 
sian policy toward a rapprochement with a 
France lusting for revenge was Prince Bis- 
marck induced to enter into the alliance with 
Austria-Hungary ; through the alliance with 
Rumania he barred an advance of Russia 
toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky con- 
demns the basic principles o'f Bismarck's 
policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Rus- 
sia went to pieces— Bjorki proves it— or re- 
mained ineffective, like the so-called Pots- 
dam agreement. Also, Russia was not al- 
ways our ' best neighbor.' Under Queen 
Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for pos- 
session of East Prussia to extend her Baltic 
coasts and to insure her domination of the 
Baltic. The Petrograd ' window ' has gradu- 
ally widened, so as to take in Esthonia, 
Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach 
after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a 
field over which to send troops against us. 
Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Rus- 
sian policy to an ever greater degree, had 
positive anti-German tendencies. 

" And we did not force Russia to drop ' her 
policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to 
defend ourselves against her encroachments 
in European policy and her encircling of our 
Austro-Hungarian ally. 

Grey Conciliatory 

" Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [Brit- 
ish Foreign Secretary] did we want war to 
come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of 
our unhappy experience at Algeciras, we 
agreed to a conference. The credit of an 
' attitude of mediation ' at the conference 
should not be denied Sir Edward Grey ; but 
that he ' by no means placed himself on the 
side of the Entente ' is, however, surely 
saying rather too much. Certainly he often 
advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in 
Vienna) and found ' formulas of agreement,' 
but in dealing with the other side he repre- 
sented the Entente, because he, no less than 
ourselves, neither would, nor could, aban- 
don his associates. That we, on the other 
hand, ' without exception, represented the 
standpoint dictated to us from Vienna ' is 
absolutely false. We, like England, played 
a mediatory role, and also in Vienna coun- 
seled far more yielding and moderation 
than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know 
about, or even to suggest. And then 
Vienna made several far-reaching conces- 
sions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lich- 
nowsky, who always wanted to be wiser 
than the Foreign Office, and who apparently 



XXX. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



allowed himself to be strongly influenced 
by the Entente statesmen, did not know 
this, he surely ought not to make any false 
assertions now ! If, to be sure, the degree 
of yielding that was necessary was reached 
in Vienna, we also naturally had to repre- 
sent the Austrian standpoint at the confer- 
ence. Ambassador Szogyeni himself was 
not one of the extremists ; in Vienna they 
were by no means always satisfied with 
his attitude. That the Ambassador, with 
whom I was negotiating almost every day, 
constantly sounded the refrain of casus foe- 
deris is entirely unknown to me. It cer- 
tainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for 
some time past had not been counted as a 
friend of Austria in Vienna. Still com- 
plaints about him came to my ears oftener 
from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Ital- 
ian Foreign Minister] than from the side of 
Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
Minister. ] 

" King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari con- 
stituted a mockery of the entire conference 
and a snub to all the powers taking part 
in it. 

" Russia was by no means obliged ' to give 
way to us all along the line ' ; on the con- 
trary, she ' advanced the wishes of Serbia ' 
in several ways, Serbia even receiving some 
cities and strips of territory that could have 
been regarded as purely Albanian or prepon- 
deratingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 
' the course of the conference was a fresh 
humiliation for the self-consciousness of Rus- 
sia ' and that there was a feeling of resent- 
ment in Russia on that account. It cannot 
be the task of our policy to satisfy all the 
unjustified demands of the exaggerated self- 
consciousness of a power by no means friend- 
ly to us, at the. cost of our ally. Russia has 
no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our 
ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnow- 
sky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same 
stand as Russia, the result would have been 
a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus 
a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnow- 
sky seems only anxious that Russia be not 
humiliated ; a humiliation of Austria is ap- 
parently a matter of indifference to him. 

The "Wily" Venizelos 

" When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 
' Austrophilie ' was not adapted to ' promote 
Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly 
understand what this means. Following a 
disastrous diversion toward Bast Asia— in the 
Japanese war we had favored Russia without 
even being thanked for it ! — Russia again took 
up her policy directed toward the European 
Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with 
renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buch- 
lau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Rus- 
sian Foreign Minister after Germany forced 
the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 
1909.] 

" Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 
' Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evi- 
dently knew how to throw a little sand into 



the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast 
to King Constantine and Theototy, always 
was pro-Entente. His present attitude re- 
veals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr 
Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward 
Petrograd. 

" That Count Berchtold displayed certain 
inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its dif- 
ferences with Rumania is true ; that we ' nat- 
urally went with him ' is, however, entirely 
false. With our support, King Carol had the 
satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended 
second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the 
case of the Bucharest peace, in which we 
favored the wishes and interests of Rumania, 
which was allied to us, our policy deviated 
somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro- 
Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe — 
as Prince Lichnowsky asserts — that it ' could 
count upon our support in case of its re- 
vision.' That Marquis San Giuliano ' is said 
to have warned us already in the Summer 
of 1913 from becoming involved in a world 
war,' because at that time in Austria ' the 
thought of a campaign against Serbia " had 
found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. 
Just as little do I know that Herr von 
Tschirschky — who certainly was rather pes- 
simistic by nature — is said to have declared 
in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would 
be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant 
of the ' important happenings ' that Prince 
Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! 
Such events as the English visit to Paris — 
Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent — 
surely must have been known to the Am- 
bassador, and we informed him about the 
secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be 
sure, he did not want to believe it ! 

" In the matter of Liman von Sander, 
[German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] 
we made a far-reaching concession to Russia 
by renouncing the General's power of com- 
mand over Constantinople. I will admit that 
this point of the agreement over the military 
mission was not opportune politically. 

" When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of hav- 
ing succeeded in giving the treaty a form 
corresponding to our wishes, this credit must 
not be denied him, although it certainly re- 
quired strong pressure on several occasions 
to induce him to represent some of our de- 
sires with more emphasis. 

" When Prince Lichnowsky says that he 
received the authorization definitely to con- 
clude the treaty, after he previously asserts 
that ' the treaty was consequently dropped,' 
this contains a contradiction which we may* 
let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky' s 
assertion, however, that we delayed publica- 
tion because the treaty would have been ' a 
public success ' for him that we begrudged 
him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can 
only be explained through his self-centred 
conception of things. The treaty would have 
lost its practical and moral effect— one of its 
main objects was to create a good atmos- 
phere between us and England — if its publi- 
cation had been greeted with violent attacks 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXXI. 



upon ' perfidious Albion ' in our Anglophobe 
press and in our Parliament. And there is no 
doubt that, in view of our internal posi- 
tion at that time, this is what the simultane- 
ous publication of the so-called "Windsor 
Treaty would have caused. And the howl 
about English perfidy that the internal con- 
tradiction between the text of the Windsor 
Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have 
called forth would hardly have been stilled 
in the minds of our public through the as- 
surance of English bona fides. 

" Untenable " Charges 

" With justified precaution, we intended to 
allow the publication to be made only at the 
proper moment, when the danger of disap- 
proving criticism was no longer so acute, if 
possible simultaneously with the announce- 
ment of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was 
on the point of being concluded. The fact 
that two great agreements had been con- 
cluded between us and England would doubt- 
less have materially favored their reception 
and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic 
defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was 
consideration for the effect of the agreement 
— with which we wanted to improve our re- 
lations with England, not to generate more 
trouble — that caused our hesitation. 

"It is correct that— although in a sec- 
ondary degree — consideration was also taken 
of the efforts just then being made to obtain 
economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, 
which the publication of the agreement would 
naturally have made more difficult to real- 
ize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky 
may not have been able to perceive fully 
from London, but he should have trusted in 
our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, 
instead of replacing his lack of understand- 
ing with suspicions and the interjection of 
personal motives. He certainly would have 
found our arguments understood by the Eng- 
lish statesmen themselves. 

" The Ambassador's speeches aroused con- 
siderable adverse sentiment in this country. 
It was necessary for the creation of a better 
atmosphere, in which alone the rapproche- 
ment being worked for could flourish, that 
confidence in our English policy and in our 
London Ambassador be spread also among 
our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, 
otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, 
did not take this motive sufficiently into 
account, for he saw everything only through 
his London spectacles. The charges against 
the attitude of the Foreign Office are too 
untenable to be bothered with. I would only 
like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky 
was not left in ignorance regarding the 
' most important things,' in so far as they 
were of value to his mission. On the con- 
trary, I gave the Ambassador much more 
general information than used to be the 
custom. My own experiences as Ambassa- 
dor induced me to do so. But with Lich- 
nowsky there was the inclination to rely 



more upon his own impressions and judg- 
ment than upon the information and advice 
of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not 
always have either the motive or the au- 
thority to impart the sources of our news. 
Here there were quite definite considerations, 
particularly anxiety regarding the compro- 
mising of our sources. The Prince's mem- 
orandum furnishes the best justification for 
the caution exercised in this regard. 

Defense of Archduke 

" It is not true that in the Foreign Office 
the reports that England would protect 
France under all circumstances were not 
believed. 

" At Knopischt, on the occasion of the 
visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Arch- 
duke heir apparent, no plan of an active 
policy against Serbia was laid down. Arch- 
duke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the 
champion of a policy leading to war for 
which he has often been taken. During the 
London conference he advised moderation and 
the avoidance of war. 

" Prince Lichnowsky's ' optimism ' was 
hardly justified, as he has probably con- 
vinced himself since through the revelations 
of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret 
Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, 
as said before, he was informed) should have 
made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the 
suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor 
and the Under Secretary of State was well 
grounded. How does this agree with the 
assertion that we, relying upon the reports of 
Count Pourtales that ' Russia would not move 
under any circumstances,' had not thought 
of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so 
far as I can recollect, Count Pourtales [Ger- 
man Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never 
made such reports. 

Blame for Russia 

" That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed 
against the constant provocations stirred up 
by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which 
reached their climax in the outrage of Sera- 
jevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite 
of all the former settlements- and avoidances 
of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon 
her policy, which aimed at the complete 
exclusion of the Austrian influence (and 
naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The 
Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, con- 
tinued their incitement. It was a question 
of the prestige and the existence of the 
Danube Monarchy. It must either put up 
with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or com- 
mand a quos ego, even at the risk of war. 
We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had 
the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio 
of the war in general, the alliance should not 
have been concluded. Besides, it was plain 
that the Russian military preparations, (for 
instance, the extension of the railroads and 
forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting 
for revenge had lent the money and which 
would have been completed in a few years, 



XXXII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



were directed principally against us. But 
despite all this, despite the fact that the ag- 
gressive tendency of the Russian policy was 
becoming more evident from day to day, the 
idea of a preventive war was far removed 
from us. We only decided to declare war on 
Russia in the face of the Russian mobiliza- 
tion and to prevent a Russian invasion. 

" I have not the letters exchanged with the 
Prince at hand — it was a matter of private 
letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the aban- 
donment of Austria. I replied, so far as I 
remember, that we, aside from our treaty ob- 
ligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the 
uncertain friendship of England. If we 
abandoned our only reliable ally later we 
would stand entirely isolated, face to face 
with the Entente. It is likely that I also 
wrote that ' Russia was constantly becoming 
more anti-German ' and that we must ' just 
risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, 
in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a lit- 
tle and to prevent him from exposing his 
views also in London, may also have written 
that there would probably be some ' bluster ' ; 
that ' the more firmly we stood by Austria 
the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said 
already that our policy was not based upon 
alleged reports excluding war ; certainly at 
that time I still thought war could be avoid- 
ed, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of 
the very serious danger. 

" We could not agree to the English pro- 
posal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it 
would doubtless have led to a serious diplo- 
matic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb 
and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather 
opposed to Austria. The ' intimacy of the 
Russo-Italian relations ' is admitted by 
Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and 
only feasible way of escape was a localiza- 
tion of the conflict and an understanding be- 
tween Vienna and Petrograd. We worked 
toward that end with all our energy. That 
we ' insisted upon ' the war is an unheard-of 
assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by 
the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to 
the Czar and to King George, published in 
the White Books— Prince Lichnowsky only 
cares to tell about ' the really humble tele- 
gram of the Czar '—as well as the instruction 
we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is 
formed by the sentence : 

" ' When Count Berchtold finally decided 
to come around we answered the Russian 
mobilization, after Russia had vainly nego- 
tiated and waited a whole week, with the ulti- 
matum and the declaration of war.' 

[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow 
omits the former's statement that Count 
Berchtold " hitherto had played the strong 
man on instructions from Berlin."] 

" Wrong " Conclusions 

" Should we, perhaps, have waited until 
the mobilized Russian Army was streaming 
over our borders? The reading of the 
Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even 
Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of ' Oh si 



tacuisses! ' On July 5 I was absent from 
Berlin. The declaration that I was ' shortly 
thereafter in Vienna ' ' in order to talk 
everything over with Count Berchtold ' is 
false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from 
my honeymoon trip and did not leave there 
until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shift- 
ing of the Great Headquarters. As Secre- 
tary of State I was only once in Vienna be- 
fore the war, in the Spring of 1913. 

" Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over 
the matter of the confusing dispatch that 
he sent us on Aug. 1 — at present I am not 
in possession of the exact wording— as a 
' misunderstanding' and even seems to want 
to reproach us because ' in Berlin the news, 
without first waiting for the conversation, 
was made the basis of a far-reaching ac- 
tion.' The question of war with England 
was a matter of minutes, and immediately 
after the arrival of the dispatch it was de- 
cided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to 
avoid war with France and England. His 
Majesty sent the well-known telegram to 
King George. The contents of the Lich- 
nowsky dispatch could not have been under- 
stood any other way than we understood it. 

" Objectively taken, the statement of 
Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abun- 
dance of inaccuracies and distortions that 
it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions 
are also entirely wrong. The reproach that 
we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petro- 
grad merely because of the mobilization of 
Russia and on July 31 declared war upon 
the Russians, although the Czar had pledged 
his word that not a man should march so 
long as negotiations were under way, thus 
willfully destroying the possibility of a 
peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque 
effect. In concluding, the statement seems 
almost to identify itself with the standpoint 
of our enemies. 

" When the Ambassador makes the accu- 
sation that our policy identified itself ' with 
Turks and Austro-Magyars ' and ' subjected 
itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Buda- 
pest,' he may be suitably answered that he 
saw things only through London spectacles 
and from the narrow point of view of his 
desired rapprochement with England a tout 
prix. He also appears to have forgotten 
completely that the Entente was formed 
much more against us than against Austria. 

" I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at 
an understanding with England, because I 
was of the opinion that this was the only 
way for us to escape ' from the unfavorable 
position in which we were placed by the un- 
equal division of strength and the weakness 
of the Triple Alliance.. But Russia and 
France insisted upon war. We were obli- 
gated through our treaty with Austria, and 
our position as a great power was also 
threatened— hie Rhodus, hie salta. But Eng- 
land, that was not allfed in the same way 
with Russia and that had received far-reach- 
ing assurances from us regarding the sparing 
of France and Belgium, seized the sword. 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXXIII. 



" In saying- this, I by no means share the 
opinion prevalent among us today that Eng- 
land laid all the mines for the outbreak of 
the war ; on the contrary, I believe in Sir 
Edward Grey's love of peace and in his 
earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with 
us. But he had allowed himself to become 
entangled too far in the net of the Franco- 
Russian policy ; he no longer found the way 
out, and he did not prevent the world war — 
something that he could have done. Neither 
was the war popular with the English people ; 
Belgium had to serve as a battle cry. 

" ' Political marriages for life and death ' 
are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible 
in international unions. But neither is iso- 
lation, under the present condition of affairs 
in Europe. The history of Europe consists 
of coalitions that sometimes have led to the 
avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes 
to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolv- 
ing of old alliances that no longer correspond 
to all conditions is only in order when new 
constellations are attainable. This was the 
object of the policy of a rapprochement with 
England. So long as this policy did not 
offer reliable guarantees we could not aban- 
don the old guarantees — even with their 
obligations. 



" The Morocco policy had led to a political 
defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been 
luckily avoided, the same as at the London 
Conference. A fresh diminution of our 
prestige was not endurable for our position 
in Europe and in the world. The prosperity 
of States, their political and economic suc- 
cesses, are based upon the prestige that they 
enjoy in the world. 

" The personal attacks contained in the 
work, the unheard-of calumnies and slan- 
ders of others, condemn themselves. The 
ever -recurring suspicion that everything 
happened only because it was not desired to 
allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes 
speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed 
hopes for personal successes, and has a pain- 
ful effect. 

" In closing, let us draw attention here to 
what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in 
his work, ' The Old and New Central Eu- 
rope,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck 
of the year 1879, in which the idea is devel- 
oped that the German Empire must never 
dare allow a situation in which it would 
remain isolated on the European Continent 
between Russia and France, side by side with 
a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been 
left in the lurch by Germany." 



German Comments om von Jagow's Views 



IN commenting upon Herr von Jagow's re- 
ply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg Bern- 
hard, editor in chief of the Vossische 
Zeitung, took occasion to re-emphasize his 
favorite theory of a rapprochement with 
Russia so as to enable Germany to reduce 
Great Britain to the level of a second-class 
power. In a long article, printed on March 
31, Herr Bernhard asserted that Prince Lich- 
nowsky had been by no means alone in his 
policy of seeking agreement with England 
as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted, and 
that the German Foreign Office had seemed 
obsessed with the idea that it was a ques- 
tion of a choice between Austria and Eng- 
land, when, in reality, if the diplomats had 
wanted to pursue a good German policy and 
at the same time be of service to Austria, 
they should have made it a question of Rus- 
sia or England and tried to establish good 
relations with the former under all circum- 
stances. After quoting von Jagow's remark 
about the inadvisability of abandoning old 
alliances until new constellations were at- 
tainable, Herr Bernhard said: 

" We Shall not go into the question here 
if, during this war, which strains all the 
forces of the alliance to the utmost, a for- 
mer German Secretary of State should have 
written such sentences. It is incomprehen- 
sible how they came from the pen of a sen- 
sible man — and Herr von Jagow is such a 
one. And it is still more incomprehensible 
how they were able to escape the attention 



of the Foreign Office. Fortunately, they 
can no longer do any harm now, as through 
our deeds we have demonstrated our loyalty 
to the Austrians and Hungarians better than 
it can be done by any amount of talk." 

In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard re- 
ferred as follows to von Jagow's admission 
that he did not believe that England had laid 
all the mines leading to the world war: 

" In spite of all experiences, therefore, 
here is another — almost official — attempt 
made to represent the war as merely the re- 
sult of the aggressive desires of France and 
Russia. As if France (through whose pop- 
ulation went a shudder of fear as it saw 
itself on the edge of the abyss of war) would 
ever have dared to go to war without know- 
ing that England stood back of her ! And 
were Edward's trips to Paris without any 
effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also 
finally become sufficiently well known 
through the reports of the Belgian Ambas- 
sador how France repeatedly tried to escape 
from the alliance, but was always again 
forced into the net by Nicolson, [former 
British Under Secretary for Foreign Af- 
fairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chan- 
cellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, himself ad- 
mitted in the Reichstag the harmful role of 
King Edward. Only he, as probably did 
Herr von Jagow also, thought that Edward's 
death put an end to the policy of encircling. 
But this policy of encircling— and here 
is where the mistake entailing seri- 



XXXIV. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



ous consequences is made by our diplomats — 
was not at all merely a personal favorite 
idea of Edward "VII., but the continuation 
of the traditional English policy toward the 
strongest Continental power." 

Herr Bernhard then asserted that England 
desired the publication of the proposed An- 
glo-German treaty regarding the division of 
the Portuguese colonies into spheres of eco- 
nomic interests so as to make Portugal's 
eventual support of the Entente all the 
surer, and continued : 

Thanks for Hindenburg 

" And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this 
trap set by England. It was avoided by the 
Foreign Office more through instinct than 
sagacity. And these diplomats have guided 
Germany's destiny before and during the 
war ! Let us give the warmest thanks to 
Hindenburg because his sword has now, it is 
to be hoped, put an end once for all to the 
continued spinning of plans by such and 
similar diplomats even during the war." 

Teodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Ber- 
liner Tageblatt, probably the leading organ 
of the German business elements and liberal 
politicians who were opposed to the war from 
the beginning, and who still hope for a nego- 
tiated peace that will facilitate an early 
resumption of trade relations' with Great 
Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed 
the hope that the " battle of minds will 
finally create a clearer atmosphere," and 
then remarked : 

" Only quite incidentally would I like to 
allow myself to direct the attention of Herr 
von Jagow to an erroneous expression that 
appears twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow 
writes : ' "We informed him [Lichnowsky] of 
the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' 
and in another place : ' The secret Anglo- 
Russian naval agreement might also have 
made him a little more skeptical.' Only the 
day before, on Saturday, it was said in an 
article of the Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zei- 
tung, also directed against Lichnowsky : 
' Negotiations were pending with Russia over 
a naval agreement that the Prince character- 
istically passes over in silence.' In reality, 
although hasty historians also speak with- 
out further ceremony of a treaty, it is mani- 
fest that no Anglo-Russian agreement exist- 
ed; there was merely a Russian proposal, 
and the most that can be said is that ' nego- 
tiations were pending.' * * * 

" His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true 
that the Foreign Office did not believe the 
reports that England would protect France 
under all circumstances,' is in contradiction 
with the well-known report of the then Eng- 
lish Ambassador, Goschen, which describes 
into what surprise and consternation Herr 
von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were 
thrown by the news of the English declara- 
tion of war." 

In beginning his comment upon von Jagow, 



Herr Wolff threw a little more light upon 
the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's mem- 
orandum " for the family archives " got into 
more or less general secret circulation in 
Germany before it was printed by the Swed- 
ish Socialist paper Politiken last March, and 
also described the character of Captain 
Beerfelde, the member of the German Gen- 
eral Staff who, according to some cabled 
reports, is to be tried for his part in distrib- 
uting copies of the memorandum. 

Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky 
had had five or six copies made, of which he 
had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, 
head of the Hamburg- American line, and 
another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of 
the Deutsche Bank. All of these persons 
carefully hid the " dangerous gift " in the 
deepest recesses of their writing desks, but 
a fourth copy went astray and got into 
hands for which it had not been intended, 
and from these hands passed into those of 
still another individual. Then the editor 
wrote : 

How Manuscript Became Public 

" I made the acquaintance some years be- 
fore the war of the officer who obtained the 
memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of 
it to State officials and politicians. He be- 
longs to an old noble family, was treated 
with sympathy by General von Moltke, the 
Chief of the General Staff, occupied himself 
enthusiastically with religious philosophy or 
theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but 
mystic person. * * * After hard war ex- 
periences, he felt the longing to serve the 
dictates of peace with complete devotion, and 
he surrendered himself to a pacifism which 
is absolutely incompatible with the uniform. 

" Late one evening he visited me in a state 
of great excitement, and told me that he had 
manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lich- 
nowsky which had been lent to him, and that, 
without asking the author, he had sent it 
to the ' leading men.' It was impossible to 
convince him by any logic or on any grounds 
of reason that his action was wrong, sense- 
less, and harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, 
or, still more, a Horatius Codes, who, out 
of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang 
into the abyss." 

The Berlin Vorwarts, the leading organ of 
the pro-Government Socialists, began its ed- 
itorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking 
that the article of the former State Secre- 
tary for Foreign Affairs was hardly cal- 
culated to convince the reader that Prince 
Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only thing 
that had had a " painful effect " upon the 
German people in July; 1914, and since that 
time. It then said that " Herr von Jagow 
agrees with Lichnowsky upon the decisive 
point!" quoted what von Jagow had said 
about his desire for an Anglo-German rap- 
prochement, and continued : 

" These words show mat, in 1913, the Wil- 
helmstrasse and the London Embassy were 
in the complete harmony of common beliefs 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXXV. 



and intentions. Herr von Jagow, exactly like 
Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and ex- 
actly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possi- 
bility of creating ' an atmosphere of confi- 
dence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and 
England, through a series of agreements, of 
which those regarding the Bagdad Railroad 
and Africa were to have been the first." 

Vorwarts then proceeded to point out that 
the Albanian crisis had strengthened this 
faith instead of weakening it, took up von 
Jagow's reasons for Germany's refusal to 
have the proposed Anglo-German agreement 
on the Portuguese African colonies published, 
and exclaimed : 

" What a fear of Tirpitz ! A disturbing of 
the new relations through his intrigues and 
the howling of his jingo press was to be 
avoided through an affectation of secrecy. 
But three weeks later the war with England 
was here and the Pan-German sheets wel- 
comed ' the longed-for day ! ' What had hap- 
pened in the meantime? Of course, ' perfid- 
ious Albion ' (even Jagow puts quotation 
marks on these words) had in the meantime 
thrown off the mask and revealed her per- 
fidy ! Let's hear what — after Lichnowsky — 
Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for For- 
eign Affairs in July, 1914, has to say 
about it! " 

Then Vorwarts quoted Jagow's description 
of how the war began, and went on : 

" All that remains of the accusations 
against the English Government is that it 
did not prevent the world war, ' although it 
could have done so.' Now Herr von Jagow 
also did not prevent the world war, but he 
must certainly be acquitted of the charge 
that he could have prevented it. He really 
could not, and so an emphatic statement of 
inability is the best excuse for him and his 
fellow-disputants. 

" Let us establish the facts. England did 
not desire the war; she merely did not pre- 
vent it. The war was not popular in Eng- 
land ; it also was not popular in Russia and 
France. But it has become popular. The 
whole world — right away across the Atlantic 
and the Pacific — is united in hatred against 
us. We, however, have for almost four years 
been inoculated with the view that ' England 
laid all the mines which caused the war ' — 
a view which the Secretary of State, in ac- 
cordance with the evidence of the Ambassa- 
dor, has now declared to be false ! It is, 
however, by this false view that the whole 
war policy of the German Empire has been 
directed— from the declaration of unrestrict- 
ed submarine warfare, which brought us 
war with America, down to those Chancellor 
speeches which say that Belgium must not 
again become England's area of military con- 
centration. 



" If all the parties concerned were con- 
vinced that the belief in England's guilt is a 
fiction, why did they feed this belief, and 
why did they pursue a policy which was 
based upon it? They ought rather to have 
appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, 
perhaps, believes what he says. Instead of 
that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been 
pursued. Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz 
has been attempted, but it has always been 
reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of 
the nationalistic terror. 

" This fear was, perhaps, not entirely un- 
founded, for agitation is unscrupulous. The 
older ones among us still remember very 
well ' an Englishwoman ' who was very un- 
popular in many circles, but this English- 
woman was the mother of the German 
Kaiser. No doubt there was no more con- 
venient method for the Government to guard 
the dynasty than for it to take part in, or 
at least to tolerate, the agitation against 
the English. This was the only way of pre- 
venting the agitation from turning ultimately 
against the wearer of the German imperial 
crown. But ought such intimate considera- 
tions to have been permitted to play a part 
when the fate of the nations was at stake? 

" Let us put an end to this ! At this 
moment we are in a battle which may be 
decisive and which is going in favor of the 
empire. But even after this battle we shall 
possess neither the possibility nor the moral 
right to treat our opponent according to the 
principle of ' With thumbs in his eyes and 
knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest 
military successes there exists the necessity 
for political negotiation. It will be easier 
for us to enter into this negotiation after 
the poisonous fog of the war lies shall have 
lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has 
cleared up the role played by England at the 
beginning of the war, there is nothing in the 
way of the fulfillment of the promise made 
by Bethmann to ' make good the wrong com- 
mitted against Belgium ' ! 

" If it is perhaps true chat everything Wil- 
helm II., Bethmann, von Jagow, and Lich- 
nowsky thought was true up to three weeks 
before the outbreak of the war was false, 
then let the mistake be acknowledged and 
the conservative Pan-Germans be put openly 
in the Government, so that they, both within 
and without, may complete the work of a 
peace by force. But if this is neither de- 
sirable nor possible, then there is nothing 
left to do but to take a decided step ahead. 
For the German people cannot be satisfied 
with the methods of governing exercised 
before and during the war. * * * The Ger- 
man people can only endure after the war as 
a peace-loving nation that governs itself." 



Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's 
Long Plotting for Domination 

By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S. 



TO a Britisher who has followed the trend 
of events in the Near East, and who 
has witnessed the gradual development 
of German intrigues in that area, there has 
never been published a document so im- 
portant and so condemnatory of Germany as 
the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky. 

On the one hand, the memorandum of the 
Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London proves 
from an authoritative enemy pen that, prac- 
tically ever since the Russo-Turkish war of 
1877-78, and particularly from the time of 
the accession of the present Emperor to the 
throne in 1S88, the Germans have carefully 
prepared the way for the present war, and 
that during this period they have consistently 
turned their attention toward the East and 
toward the development of the Mitteleuropa 
scheme. And on the other side it indicates, 
if indeed any indication were still required, 
that the so-called rivalry existing between 
England and Germany prior to the war 
arose not from any desire on the part of 
Great Britain to stand in the way of the 
development of legitimate German interests 
in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, but from 
the unwillingness of the Government, of Ber- 
lin to agree to any reasonable settlement of 
the many all-important questions connected 
with these regions. 

Although for years the Germans had been 
intriguing against the Triple Entente, Prince 
Lichnowsky, a man possessed of personally 
friendly feelings for England, was sent to 
London in order to camouflage the real 
designs of the enemy and to secure repre- 
sentation by a diplomatist who was intended 
to make good, and who, in fact, did make 
a high position for himself in British official 
and social circles. The appointment itself 
raises two interesting questions. In the first 
place, while this is not stated in the memo- 
randum, it is clear that, whereas Baron 
Marschall von Bieberstein was definitely in- 
structed to endeavor to make friends with 
England and to detach her from France and 
Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring 
about war at a convenient time for Germany, 
Prince Lichnowsky' s task was somewhat dif- 
ferent. Kept at least more or less in the 
dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, 
who arrived in London when the Morocco 
crisis of 1911 was considered at an end, in- 
stead of being intrusted with the dual ob- 
jects of his predecessor, was clearly told to do, 
and did in fact do, his utmost to establish 
friendly relations with England. The Berlin 
Government, on the other hand, this time 
maintained in its .own hands the larger 
question of the making of war at what it 



believed, happily wrongly, to be a convenient 
time for the Central Empires. In the second 
place, although this, too, is not explained, 
various references made by Prince Lichnow- 
sky leave little doubt in the mind of the 
reader who knows the situation existing at 
the German Embassy prior to the outbreak 
of war that the Ambassador himself was 
aware that von Kiihlmann — the Councilor of 
Embassy— was, in fact, the representative of 
Pan-Germanism, in England, and that to this 
very able and expert intriguer was" left the 
work of trying to develop a situation which, 
in peace or in war, would be favorable to 
the ruler and to the class whose views he 
voiced. 

Phases of German Policy 

To come down to the real subject of this 
article— the proof provided by Prince Lich- 
nowsky' s disclosures of the long existence 
of the German Mitteleuropa scheme and of 
the fact that Germany, and not Austria, made 
ihis war, largely with the object of pushing 
through her designs in the East— I propose 
to divide my remarks in such a way as to 
show that the development of this scheme 
passed through three phases and in each case 
to take what may be called a text from the 
document under discussion. 

The first phase lasted from the Congress 
of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky 
says that Germany began the Triple Al- 
liance policy, and more definitely from the 
accession of the present Emperor to the 
throne in 1888 until the Balkan wars. While 
in using these expressions the ex- Ambassador 
does not refer only to this period, he says : 
" The goal of our political ambition was to 
dominate in the Bosporus," and " instead 
of encouraging a powerful development in 
the Balkan States, we placed ourselves on 
the side of the Turkish and Magyar op- 
pressors." 

These words contain in essence and in tabu- 
lated form an explanation (from the pen of 
a German whose personal and official posi- 
tions enabled him to know the truth) of the 
events which were in progress during this 
period— events the full importance of which 
has often been refuted and denied by those 
who refused to see that from the first the 
Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domina- 
tion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. 
Indeed, from the moment of his accession 
the sentiments and views of the German 
ruler became markedly apparent, for one 
year later his Majesty paid the first of his 
carpet-bagging visits to Constantinople— a 
visit more or less connected with the then 



LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 



XXXVII. 



recent grabbing- of Haidar Pasha-Ismid rail- 
way—now the first section of the Bagdad 
line— by the Germans, and with the pro- 
longation of that line to Angora as a German 
concern, concessions secured by Mr. Kaula, 
acting on behalf of German interests in 1SSS. 

Preparing for Pan-German Project 

Before and particularly after the appoint- 
ment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
who had then been a personal friend of the 
Kaiser for many years, the enemy had been 
carefully preparing the way for the realiza- 
tion of his Pan-German dreams in the Near 
and Middle East. Although so far as the 
Balkan States were concerned, up to the out- 
break of the war the Kaiser endeavored to 
screen his intentions behind a nominally 
Austrian program, for years he had really 
been making ready his ground for the pres- 
ent occasion by military, political, and eco- 
nomic penetration and by diplomatic intrigues 
destined to bring about a favorable situation 
for Germany when the propitious moment for 
action arrived. The power of von der Goltz 
Pasha, who introduced the present military 
system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils 
was gradually increased until the Ottoman 
Army was finally placed completely under 
Germanic control. 

The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, 
which at first seemed destined greatly to 
minimize German power at Constantinople, 
really resulted in an opposite effect. Thus in 
spite of the effective support of England for 
Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian 
crises of 1908 and 1909, a gradual reaction 
subsequently set in. This was due in part to 
the cleverness and regardlessness of von Bie- 
berstein, and in part to the circumstances 
arising out of the policy adopted by the 
Young Turks. For instance, while the Ger- 
mans ignored the necessity for reforms in 
the Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks 
favored a Teutonic program, it was impos- 
sible for the British Government or the Brit- 
ish public to look with favor upon a regime 
which worked to maintain the privileged po- 
sition of Moslems throughout the empire, 
which did nothing to punish those who insti- 
gated the massacre of the Armenians of 
Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon 
disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, 
and upon changing the status of Egypt to the 
Turkish advantage. 

The Turco-German Entente 

Such indeed became the position that even 
the Turco-Italfan war, which might have 
been expected to shake the confidence of the 
Ottoman Government in the bona fides of 
Italy's then ally, did not seriously disturb the 
intimate relations which were gradually de- 
veloping between Berlin and Constantinople. 
Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore, 
for in addition to Austria's ol jecting to the 
inauguration of any Italian operations in 
the Balkans, the German Government, when 
the position of its representat've in Constan- 



tinople had become seriously compromised 
as a result of the Italian annexation of 
Tripoli, which he could not prevent, sud- 
denly found it convenient to transfer von 
Bieberstein to London and to replace him by 
another, perhaps less able, but certainly none 
the less successful in retaining a grasp over 
everything which took place in the Ottoman 
capital. 

Before and particularly after the accession 
of the Kaiser to the throne, the Germans 
gradually furthered their program by a sys- 
tem of railway penetration in the East. In 
the late '60s Baron Hirsch secured a con- 
cession for the construction of lines from 
Constantinople to what was then the north- 
western frontier of Eastern Rumelia, and 
from Saloniki to Mitrovitza, with a branch 
to Ristovatz on the then Serbian frontier. 
At first these lines were under French in- 
fluence, but they subsequently became largely 
an Austrian undertaking, and considerably 
later the Deutsche Bank secured a predom- 
inating proportion of the capital, thus turn- 
ing them practically into a German concern. 
In Asia Minor the British, who were origi- 
nally responsible for the construction of rail- 
ways, were gradually ousted, until, with the 
signature of the Bagdad Railway agreement 
in 1903, the Germans dominated not only 
that line, but also occupied a position in 
which, on the one hand, they had secured 
control of many of its feeders, and, on the 
other, they had jeopardized the future de- 
velopment and even the actual prosperity of 
those not already in the*r possession. 

Fruits of the Balkan Wars 

This (brings us up to the second phase in 
the development of Pan-Germanism in the 
East — the period of the Balkan wars — to- 
ward two aspects of which, as Prince Lich- 
nowsky says, the Central Powers devoted 
their attention. " Two possibilities for set- 
tling the question remained." Either Ger- 
many left the Near Eastern problem to the 
peoples themselves or she supported he>r 
allies " and carried out a Triple Alliance pol- 
icy in the East, thereby giving up the role 
of mediator." Once more, in the words of 
the Prince himself, " The German Foreign 
Office very much preferred the latter," and 
as a result supported Austria on the one 
hand in her desire for the establishment of 
an independent Albania, and on the other in 
her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria 
into the second war and to prevent that coun- 
try from providing the concessions which at 
that time would have satisfied Rumania. 

So far as the first of these questions — that 
connected with Albania — is concerned, while 
the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Aus- 
tria was actuated by the fact that she 
" would not allow Serbia to reach the Adri- 
atic," the actual creation of Albania was jus- 
tified by the existence of the Albanians as 
a nationality and by their desire for inde- 
pendent government. Indeed, that the regime 
inaugurated by the great powers on the east 



XXXVIII. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



of the Adriatic, and particularly the Govern- 
ment of "William of Wied, proved an utter 
failure, was due not so much to what Prince 
Lichnowsky describes as the " incapacity of 
existence " of Albania as to the attitude of 
the Central Powers, and especially to that 
of Austria, who, having- brought the new 
State into being, at once worked for unrest 
and for discord in the hope of being aible to 
step in to put the house in order when the 
propitious moment arrived. 

Promoting Balkan Discord 

The second direction in which the enemy 
devoted his energy was an even larger, more 
German and more far-reaching one. " The 
first Balkan war led to the collapse of Tur- 
key and with it the defeat of our policy, 
which has been identified with Turkey for 
many years," says the memorandum. This 
at one time seemed destined to carry with 
it results entirely disadvantageous to Ger- 
many. Thus, if the four States, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, who fought 
in the first war had continued on good terms 
with one another, the whole balance of 
power in Europe would almost certainly have 
been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Em- 
pire, which prior to the outbreak of these 
hostilities was held by competent authorities 
to be able to provide a vast army, then cal- 
culated to number approximately 1,225,000 
men, there would have sprung up a friendly 
group of countries which in the near future 
could easily have placed in the field a con- 
bined army approximately amounting to a"t 
least 1,000,000, all told. As the interests of 
such a confederation, which would probably 
have been joined by Rumania, would have 
been on the side of the Triple Entente, the 
Central Powers at once realized that its 
formation or its continued existence would 
mean for them not only the loss of the whole 
of Turkey, but also the gain for their ene- 
mies of four or five allies, most of whom 
had already proved their power in war. 

The Kaiser was not then prepared to make 
war, for his fleet was not ready, his Zeppe- 
lins were not perfect, and the enlargement 
of his Kiel Canal was not complete. While 
supporting Austria and at the same time 
exerting restraining influence with her, 
Germany therefore then contented herself 
by creating a favorable situation for the fu- 
ture. Thus, the Kaiser, acting still through 
the- mouthpiece of Vienna, encouraged the 
rivalry which existed between Bulgaria and 
her former allies — a rivalry which ended in 
the second Balkan war. 

That war, and particularly the fatal Treaty 
of Bucharest, was temporarily " a reproach 



to Austria," but in the long run it was a 
trump card for Germany in that it led not 
to a settlement, but simply to the holding in 
suspense of the numerous Near Eastern ques- 
tions which had been the means of shaking 
the European concert to its very foundation. 
Indeed, that war, together with nominal set- 
tlement of the Aegean Islands question, 
which left Turkey and Greece on the most 
strained terms, and the entirely unjustifiable 
shutting off of Serbia from the Adriatic 
coast left the Near East then still Europe's 
greatest danger zone. In short, these events 
created situations as a result of which Ger- 
many would be able to bring about war at 
almost any moment and as a consequence of 
which the Balkan States were so divided in 
policy that there would be nothing seriously 
to bar an enemy push toward the East. 

German Power in Turkey 

Between the Balkan wars and the out- 
break of the European conflagration, but as 
part of the former period, there occurred two 
events of far-reaching significance. The first, 
which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, 
was the appointment of General Liman von 
Sanders practically as Commander in Chief of 
the Turkish Army— an appointment which 
Mr. Morgenthau rightly tells us constituted a 
diplomatic triumph for Germany. When coup- 
led with the fact that Enver Pasha — an out- 
and-out pro-German — became Minister of 
War about the same time, the military result 
of this appointment was an enormous im- 
provement in the efficiency of the Ottoman 
Army. Its political significance, on the other 
hand, was due to the fact that it carried with 
it a far-reaching increase of Pan-German in- 
fluence at Constantinople. 

The second event in progress during the 
interval of peace was connected with the 
Aegean Islands question. Germany, having 
first utilized her diplomatic influence in 
favor of Turkey, later on encouraged the 
Government of that country in its continued 
protests against the decision upon that ques- 
tion arrived at by the great powers. Not 
content, however, with this, the Kaiser, who 
has now adopted the policy of deportation in 
Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely 
encouraged the Turks in a like measure in 
regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor in order 
to be rid of a hostile and Christian popula- 
tion when the time for action arrived. That 
this encouragement was given was always 
apparent to those who followed the course 
of events in 1914, but that it was admitted 
by a German Admiral to Mr. Morgenthau 
constitutes a condemnation the damning- 
nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate. 




Prince Lichnowsky as Seen by a Friend 

By Baroness Souiny 



KARL MAX LICHNOWSKY, sixth Prince 
of the Princedom of Gratz, Austria, 
and Kuchelna, Prussia, officer of the 
highest orders, with a permanent seat in the 
Prussian House of Lords, is practically a 
prisoner in his castle, as a result of his out- 
spoken denunciation of German responsibility 
for the war. 

I first met Prince Lichnowsky in Flor- 
ence, in a little antiquity shop. He had his 
back turned to me and was deeply engrossed 
in studying a couple of vases. The store- 
keeper, a fantastic old Italian, gesticulated 
violently, his tongue raging like a whirlwind 
to convince his client of the value of the 
bargain he was about to close. He asked 800 
lire for the vases. Neither of them noticed 
my presence, and when the Italian stopped 
his eloquence the other began, in a broken 
voice and in broken Italian, to fight the price, 
which was much too high. 

I was anxious to see the man's face, after 
having studied the unusual lines of his head 
and his fine nervous hands. At last he 
turned around, and I looked straight into 
deep gray eyes which, interested only in his 
purchase, looked through me without seeing 
me. Both talked at the top of their voices; 
the storekeeper swore and jumped into the air 
several times, while the other rubbed his 
hands, his eyes still on the vases, which he 
was nearly ready to buy. 

I was highly amused and interested, so I 
took a close view of one of the vases, turn- 
it around the better to inspect it. Evidently 
the gentleman disliked this intensely, and, 
as if protecting the vases which were so 
nearly his, he stretched out his hands to 
them. " It is not worth while," I said in 
French to him. "It is cheap stuff, although 
the color is a good imitation." He looked 
aghast at me, and the storekeeper fumed 
restlessly when another person entered the 
little shop, who proved to be a mutual ac- 
quaintance of mine and of the buyer. After 
he had examined the vases the newcomer 
asked the storekeeper why he was trying to 
cheat his friend Prince Lichnowsky with a 
Renaissance imitation. The old man stroked 
his little white beard in embarrassment, and, 
then, smiling whimsically, apologized for 
having taken the Prince for an Englishman. 

The incident was closed, and the three of 
us left the store to walk through the Giardino 
Boboli. The Prince was still absorbed in his 
mistake in believing the vases to be genuine. 

" "We live too far from the really fine 
things in life," he said, thoughtfully. " We 
live our life too superficially; we permit 
ourselves to spend our time in ridiculous 
office work, Which they call diplomacy or 
politics. Offices are the ruin of political and 
diplomatic talents ; one is born for such a 
thing, not made." 



Only after I knew him better did I under- 
stand this temperamental remark. At the 
time I took it for the discontent of a man 
whose stomach was weak. I understood 
that he had left the Diplomatic Service, 
which had taken him down to one of the 
Balkan States, at the time when Herr von 
Biilow, later Chancellor Prince Biilow, was 
Ambassador there. 

Thanks to Lichnowsky, I entered the won- 
derful salon of von Biilow's wife, who is an 
Italian, known throughout Italy as " Donna 
Laura." Lichnowsky belonged to the inti- 
mates of this circle, never complaining of the 
insignificant position which Prince Biilow 
gave him so long as he had the privilege of 
association with these high-spirited people 
who helped him to grasp the profoundest 
meaning of State ideas. 

To understand what made Lichnowsky so 
different from the Prussian Junkers needs 
only a simple explanation. He was not a 
Prussian, nor even a German. He was ut- 
terly Slavic, descended from the Bohemian 
Lichnowskys, who, since the fourteenth cent- 
ury, when Bohemia was a centre of Euro- 
pean culture, had their estates in the Czech 
part of Silesia, which Frederick the Great, 
in the Seven Years' War, stole from Austria. 
It was remarkable what a distinctive at- 
mosphere his home breathed, although it was 
only in an indifferent apartment house in the 
Tiergarten Street. When at a visitor's ap- 
proach the hall door flew open, as if touched 
by a magic wand, a footman stood at each 
wing like a sentinel. In the little dining 
room, with a footman behind each guest at 
the table, the Prince had served the most de- 
licious luncheons and dinners. The prepara- 
tions for the meal he considered of great im- 
portance, and at the table he noted his crit- 
icisms in a little book placed beside his plate. 
It was a culinary joy to eat with Prince 
Lichnowsky, but the food never interfered 
with the intense conversation inspired by the 
Prince and kept going by his comments. 

In his amazing revelations the Prince sar- 
castically remarked that he did not belong 
to the inner circle of the Kaiser. I had to 
smile, remembering his conversations breath- 
ing his revolt against junkerdom, narrow- 
mindedness, and all the faded ideas preached 
at the castle of his Majesty, which under- 
mine all modern and original movements in 
art and literature. Painters like Liebermann 
and originators of new theatrical ideas like 
Reinhardt belonged to the Lichnowsky circle, 
and there was no modern thought, no ideas 
of a free genius, which were not deeply dis- 
cussed in Prince Lichnowsky's house. 

To the great surprise of his friends, Prince 
Lichnowsky married in August, 1904. His 
friends at first feared that the unique, re- 
fined, and intellectual circle would cease to 



XL. 



THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 



be, but they soon found their fears to be 
groundless. The Prince had found the right 
wife. Mechtilde, Countess Arco, was fresh 
as a rose in body and in spirit. She was 
reared in happy Munich, where aristocracy 
was no barrier to developing in a wholesome 
and Bohemian way. This marriage was ar- 
ranged by Prince Karl's mother, who was 
anxious that the Lichnowsky line should not 
be extinguished with her only son. It turned 
out to be the happiest combination of spirits, 
and the family tree was continued in two 
fine boys and a golden-curled girl. 

More than ever Prince Lichnowsky retired 
from the political horizon without any ten- 
dency to live in the good graces of his 
Majesty the Kaiser. He was utterly bored 
with his inherited duties, and he was more 
interested in the sharp political sarcasms of 
a Maximilian Harden than in the political 
and diplomatic blunders committed in the 
Reichstag. 

With all his liberal ideas he was an aristo- 
crat. Though strikingly ugly, this was com- 
pletely forgotten when he spoke and smiled. 
He was small and almost deformed, with 
feet too big, with a grave and heavy car- 
riage, his hands always clasped behind him, 
and with the excited, high-pitched voice of a 
boy. 

So he sat aside for many years — waiting 
for a big job, as he always said. Whenever 
an embassy was vacant, the name of Lich- 
nowsky came up, only to vanish. His ap- 
pointment was always postponed, for he was 
not liked on account of his independent 
spirit and modern ideas. 

There was the greatest difference between 
his two estates at Kuchelna in Prussia and 
Gratz in Austria, especially in their -spirit. 
Gratz still breathed the easy-going, refined 
taste of his artistic and musical ancestors. In 
the castle is a room where Beethoven wrote 
many of his immortal works ; the piano was 
left untouched as Beethoven had closed it. 
Those who know the life of Beethoven know 
that it was a Prince Lichnowsky, the present 
Prince's grandfather, who was one of the 
truest and most devoted patrons of the great 
and unhappy composer. Beethoven dedica- 
ted one of his sonatas to him. 

No wonder that Beethoven was inspired in 
the wonderful gardens of Gratz, those endless 
alleys with blossoming horse chestnuts and 
sweet-perfumed linden trees, with myste- 
rious high woods behind the lawns, where in 
the dim light of the first dusk the deer gazed 
unafraid over the fences. All was wonder 
and romance around the old castle, and un- 
bounded hospitality was offered to the guests. 
All was gay and happy there. The servants 
came from families which had served the 



family for centuries. In the guest rooms 
there was a placard asking the guests not 
to tip the servants. 

The Prince was a thorough farmer — he 
kneW all about cattle, grain, sugar beets, 
and how to make his estate self-supporting 
and even money-making. 

It was a wonderful free community which 
always surrounded the Prince in Gratz. In 
the library of the castle there were the 
liveliest discussions, a free interchange of 
ideas. 

It was different at Kuchelna. This was the 
place of the Prince's black thoughts; here the 
inhabitants of the village looked sullen and 
subjugated. They never belonged in their 
hearts to the cold Prussian domination. Here 
the Prince had to perform his social duties, 
to give hunting parties arranged for the 
German aristocracy, his neighbors. To these 
he had to invite the Court people. 

When the day came when he was needed 
Prince Lichnowsky was well prepared for the 
responsibility of the London Ambassadorship. 
Nominated by the Court party as a temporary 
man, he was greeted by the younger set of 
politicians with great expectations. He had 
been trained by the best minds and influenced 
by the most liberal men, and later he proved 
to his teachers that he had not only under- 
stood them, but had developed in his own 
way practical ideas which were far ahead 
of all gray theories. 

No wonder that he loved England and tnat 
the English understood him. When he says 
in his revelations that the Kaiser did not 
wish him to improve the relations between 
England and Germany and envied him his 
personal success, it is not vanity which 
prompts the statement, but a deep under- 
standing of the fact that the Kaiser would 
not have his relations with England changed 
unless he himself could accomplish it. Since 
all the world knew of the antipathy of King 
Edward for him, the Kaiser wished, through 
realizing his ambition, to show that King 
Edward's dislike was personal and unjust 
and that the English people had no hard 
feeling toward him. 

The last time I saw Prince Lichnowsky was 
in Berlin. He was on a vacation from Lon- 
don and on his way home. Then the war 
came, catching so many of us in a country 
friendly and hospitable yesterday— hard and 
merciless today. Lichnowsky returned from 
England and met hostility. He felt that he 
had never belonged to the German race. His 
flaming " I Accuse " was poured forth from 
his oppressed soul. He could not wait for 
history to justify him and to condemn the 
Kaiser and his helpers before all mankind 
for all eternity. 



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